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NOTES
MERGING WITHOUT PURGING:
INCENTIVIZING BOARDS OF DIRECTORS
TO PROMOTE DIVERSITY THROUGH M & A
HAYLEY BuCKRIDGE1
"Standards are nothing more than structured
preferences... [a]s a society, we have yet to look carefully
beneath them to see where the seeds of prejudice are truly
hidden."2
INTRODUCTION
Since the last wave of corporate accounting scandals,
Americans have embraced the idea of holding directors and
1 J.D. Candidate, St. John's University School of Law, June 2006; B.A. English,
Philosophy, cum laude, Boston College, May 2003. The author wishes to thank Professor
Cheryl L. Wade for her guidance in the preparation of this Note, as well as for inspiring
her to write on this important topic.
2 PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 103 (Presidents and
Fellows of Harvard College ed., 1991).
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executives accountable for their wrongdoings. 3 The federal
government, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the
National Association of Securities Dealers have all adopted
corporate governance reforms addressing corporate structure,
accounting, auditing, fraud, liability, and reporting. 4 In addition,
3 Corporate scandals have occurred with frequency throughout the history of
American business, from Charles Ponzi's famous "pyramid scheme" in the 1920's to the
junk bond controversies of the mid-1980's involving Dennis B. Levine, Ivan Boesky and
Michael Milken. See Stephany Watson, Fostering Positive Corporate Culture in the Post-
Enron Era, 6 TRANSACTIONS 7, 10-15 (2004). While corporate scandals are not new, they
have currently received increased media attention due to broadened modern means of
communication. See id. at 7. Disclosures at companies such as WorldCom have promoted
increased scrutiny and have quickened the pace of change. See Andrew M. Fields &
Phyllis Y. Keys, The Emergence of Corporate Governance from Wall St. to Main St.:
Outside Directors, Board Diversity, Earnings Management, and Managerial Incentives to
Bear Risk, FIN. REV., Feb. 1, 2003, at 1.
4 Traditionally, boards of directors have consisted of both inside directors, directors
who also act as officers of the corporation, and outside directors, directors not employed by
the corporation in any other capacity. See Lynne L. Dallas, The Multiple Roles of
Corporate Boards of Directors, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 781, 782 (2003). So long as the
directors were appropriately elected by shareholders, the corporate law provided no
criteria for director eligibility. See id. However, the series of corporate admissions of fraud
and accounting improprieties in 2002 sparked major corporate governance reforms. See
Watson, supra note 3, at 25. After the accounting scandals struck, the public lost
confidence in the stock market. Id. Corporate governance became a hot conversational
topic and investors sought safer harbors in which to invest their money. See id. at 31.
Thus, many of the corporate governance reforms sought to increase trust by revamping
corporate boards of directors and encouraging stricter manager monitoring and accurate
financial reporting. Notably, the reforms were driven by a desire to facilitate the full and
fair disclosure of corporate finances. See id. at 32.
In 2002, The New York Stock Exchange adopted new rules that required more than
one-half of the board of directors to be independent and that membership on auditing,
nominating, and compensation committees be entirely composed of outside directors. See
Theresa A. Gabaldon, The Story of Pinocchio: Now I'm A Real Boy, 45 B.C. L. REV. 829,
830 (2004).
Congress promoted the restructuring of corporate boards when it enacted the Public
Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002 ("Sarbanes-Oxley"), the
"most expansive federal corporate governance legislation since the Great Depression." See
Watson, supra note 3, at 25. The Act requires the national securities exchanges and
NASDAQ to adopt corporate governance listing standards under which listed companies
are required to create an audit committee comprised solely of independent directors. The
auditing committees have the responsibility of hiring and firing auditors. See id. at 26-31.
Before Sarbanes-Oxley, management was the auditor's client. After Sarbanes-Oxley, the
auditing committee takes over this role; it evaluates and selects an auditor and takes full
responsibility for making critical decisions about a firm's accounting policy. See id. at 26-
27. Sarbanes-Oxley also requires 'rolling disclosures' of material changes in a public
company's financial condition or operation. Id. In its effect, this Act will prevent public
companies from participating in corporate restructuring, refinancing, mergers, and other
important business activities under the radar. See id. at 26. Since September, 2003, the
National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD") requires all companies listed on the
NASDAQ to have a publicly available code of conduct for all directors and employees. The
NASD also puts forth heightened criteria for independent directors, auditors and
nominating committees that exceed both the requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley and the
NYSE. See id. at 30. In 2003, the NYSE submitted a corporate governance rule filing to
the SEC which would require all companies listed on the NYSE to meet specific corporate
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most Fortune 500 companies have established codes of conduct to
ensure compliance with these newly evolving legal
requirements. 5  Currently, while the frenzy over corporate
balance sheets has died down, a less publicized but equally
important issue has re-surfaced - employment discrimination
based on race and gender. 6
Over forty years have passed since Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 was enacted; 7 yet, sex and race discrimination still
pervade corporate America. 8 Recently, in May of 2004, Boeing
settled a sex discrimination lawsuit for $72.5 million.9 Only two
months later, Morgan Stanley paid the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission $54 million to settle a similar class
action.lO This Note suggests that corporations can decrease their
governance standards including a code of business conduct and ethics for directors,
officers, and employees to foster a culture of honesty and accountability. See id. at 30.
5 See Watson, supra note 3, at 8 (defining corporate compliance programs and reasons
for establishing such programs). See generally Amy Borrus & Paula Dwyer, The SEC's
Top Cop, BUSINESS WEEK, June 21, 2004, at 116 (noting various attempts at reform by
SEC).
6 See Roger Clegg, Whistling Fairness, NAT. REV., June 16, 2005, http://
www.nationalreview.com/clegg/clegg200506160744.asp (advising employees to challenge
employers regarding illegal preferences); see also Nancy R. Mandell, $29 Million Award to
UBS Exec for Sex Discrimination is Not Enough, Says Women's Rights Advocate,
SECURITIES WEEK, Apr. 11, 2005, at 10 (discussing presence of gender discrimination on
Wall Street).
7 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2005). Title VII provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer.., to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin[.]
Id.
8 See Cheryl Wade, The Impact of U.S. Corporate Policy on Women and People of
Color, 7 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 213, 223 (2003) (highlighting recent increase in
discrimination complaints filed with EEOC); see also Susan Meisinger, HR must lead the
fight for employment equity, HR MAGAZINE, Mar. 1, 2005, at 12 (stating that women in the
same employment positions as men are still paid less).
9 See Richard W. Black and Christopher P. Reynolds, The Increasing Risk of Legal
Challenges to an Employer's Compensation Policies and Practices: Considerations for
Compensation Self-assessment, J. INVESTMENT COMPLIANCE, March 22, 2005, at 55
(noting that plaintiffs alleged "discrimination in pay, promotions, overtime, assignments,
bonuses, and other conditions of employment"); Betsy Morris et al., How Corporate
America is Betraying Women, FORTUNE, Jan. 10, 2005, at 64 (stating suit alleged that at
Boeing, women were not promoted as quickly as men).
10 See Susan Antilla, Money Talks, Women Don't, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2004, at A19.
Adding to the list of major corporations, Publix Supermarkets paid $81.5 million in 1997
and Home Depot paid at least $104 million in 1998 to settle sexual harassment or sex
discrimination claims. See Wade, supra note 8, at 224. While the most recent cases
happen to involve sex discrimination, many race discrimination lawsuits have also
resulted in multi-million dollar settlements over the past decade. Coca-Cola paid out
$192.5 million to plaintiffs to resolve a racial discrimination dispute in 2000. See id. In
1996, Texaco settled a racial discrimination suit for $176 million. See id.
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risk of being held liable for employment discrimination by
effectively diversifying and integrating their workforces and
developing workable diversity programs. However, effective
workplace diversification is particularly difficult today as
American businesses are entering into mergers and acquisitions
with increased frequency to compete with large global markets."
Accordingly, this Note asserts that, more often than not, boards
of directors will fail to consider diversity issues before approving
mergers due to the lack of legal incentives provided by current
federal and state corporate law.
Post-Enron, directors were motivated by newly enacted
corporate governance reforms to take control of accounting
frauds.12 It is suggested that corporate governance reforms are
now also necessary to encourage directors to seriously consider
human issues, specifically diversity, before recommending a
merger for shareholder approval. It is put forth that such
reforms will encourage directors to utilize intense pre-merger
deliberations and merger negotiations to make stronger
commitments to diversity and establish effective diversification
and integration programs.
This Note will explain how a corporation's commitment to
diversity will not only facilitate a more fair and productive
workforce, but will result in an overall more competitive and
profitable organization. Furthermore, this Note will discuss how
an effective diversification program will prevent costly and
stigmatizing employment discrimination litigation,' 3  ensure
11 See Shawn Tully, The Urge to Merge, FORTUNE, Feb. 21, 2005, at 21 (noting the
newly launched "merger wave" saw U.S. companies announce 48 deals of $1 billion or
more from Nov. 2004 through Jan. 2005). See generally Yuki Noguchi & Griff Witte,
Cingular Wins the Bidding, Firm Beats Out Vodafone With $41 Billion Offer for AT&T
Wireless, THE WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 18, 2004, at E01 (describing merger which created
largest cell phone company in United States).
12 See Where's All the Fun Gone?, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 20, 2004 (noting that
directors have become more serious about their duties in the post-Enron era); see also
Joan Harrison, Pitching Deals to Increasingly Skeptical Boards, MERGERS &
ACQUISITIONS, Aug. 9, 2005 (stating that directors have become more involved in deals in
the post-Enron era).
13 See Wade, supra note 8, at 225 (proposing that increase of litigation is due to
increased willingness of employees and shareholder activists to litigate discrimination
issues); see also Morris et al., supra note 9, at 65-72 (noting that companies are
vulnerable to sex-discrimination lawsuits and advising companies to adopt consistent
procedures and established guidelines for employee advancement in order to prevent
overbearing litigation).
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compliance with applicable laws, and maximize shareholder
wealth.14
I. THE BOARD'S ROLE IN MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
Corporate governance analysis typically begins with the board
of directors.15 As corporations have become larger and more
complex, the demands on corporate boards have changed.16
Deciding whether to enter into a merger or acquisition ("M&A")
is one of the most important choices a corporation makes. 17 As is
the case with most significant corporate events, the board of
directors plays a crucial role in making this choice.' 8
In the M&A context, directors have several legal obligations.
First, state corporate law usually requires board
recommendation before mergers or sales of assets can be
considered by shareholders.19  Shareholders are given the
14 See Steven Ramirez, A General Theory of Cultural Diversity, 7 MICH. J. RACE & L.
33, 36-38 (2001) (theorizing that culturally diverse workforces result in wide spectrum of
insights, increased creativity, and heightened productivity which economically benefit
companies); see also Steven Ramirez, Diversity and the Boardroom, 6 STAN. J.L. BUS. &
FIN. 85, 86, 97-99 (2000) (citing empirical studies showing that companies that promote
diversity management have competitive advantage).
15 See Eric Helland and Michael Skyuta, Regulation and the Evolution of Corporate
Boards: Monitoring, Advising, or Window Dressing?, 47 J. L. & ECON. 167, 167 (2004)
(stating that "[tlhe basic unit of analysis in corporate governance is the board of
directors"); see Brian Allen Warwick, Reinventing the Wheel: Firestone and the Role of
Ethics in the Corporation, 54 ALA. L. REV. 1455, 1455 (2003) (explaining that board of
directors is responsible for managing all aspects of corporation).
16 See Dallas, supra note 4, at 782 (noting modern corporations "require more complex
organizational structures, such as departments and divisions, a more diverse workforce
possessing various levels and areas of expertise, and a more formalized accountability
system"). See generally J. Cunyon Gordon, Painting by Numbers: "And, Urn, Let's Have a
Black Lawyer Sit at Our Table", 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1257, 1296 (2003) (describing
argument that there is economic need for diverse workforce in modern American business
world).
17 See Jonathan Choslovsky, Note & Comment, Agency Review of Health Care
Industry Mergers: Proper Procedure or Unnecessary Burden?, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 291,
298 (1996) (stating that mergers are important sources of economic activity for
corporations); see also DENNIS C. CAREY AND DAYTON OGDEN, THE HUMAN SIDE OF M&A:
How CEOs LEVERAGE THE MOST IMPORTANT ASSET IN DEAL MAKING 158 (Oxford UP
2003) (stating that mergers are enduring strategy for corporations).
18 See TW Services, Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 19, at *35
n.19 (Del. Ch. March 2, 1989) (stating corporate law gives board of directors critical role
in mergers); see also CAREY & OGDEN, supra note 17, at 160 (explaining that "human
talent and leadership" distinguish successful mergers from unsuccessful mergers).
19 See John H. Matheson and Brent A. Olson, Shareholder Rights and Legislative
Wrongs: Toward Balanced Takeover Legislation, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1425, 1434 (1991)
(explaining that "[slignificant corporate transactions, such as mergers or sales of assets,
typically require board recommendation before they are considered by the shareholders");
see also Kimble Charles Cannon, Augmenting the Duties of Directors to Protect Minority
Shareholders In the Context of Going-Private Transactions, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
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advantage of not having to make this important decision until
after the board has decided whether it is in their best interest. 20
In addition, directors have broad authority to terminate a merger
agreement without seeking shareholder approval. 21
Second, directors owe fiduciary duties to the corporation's
shareholders. 22 This Note focuses on the director's fiduciary duty
of care which includes both an obligation to undertake a rational
decision-making process before recommending the merger to
shareholders and a duty to monitor the goings-on at the
corporation throughout the merger process so as to ensure
compliance with applicable legal requirements. 23 Third, pursuant
to federal securities laws, directors must disclose material
information to shareholders regarding the merger transaction
when submitting the merger for shareholder approval. 24
191, 196 (2003) (explaining how Delaware law distinguishes between directorial duties in
a merger context as opposed to a tender offer context). See generally In Re: Siliconix Inc.,
2001 Del. Ch. LEXIS 83, at *35 (Del. Ch. June 19, 2001) (discussing how board of
directors of Siliconix made recommendation to shareholders).
20 Usually, after board approval, a majority of target shareholders must then approve
the merger. See Matheson & Olson, supra note 19, at 1434. In this respect, the board of
directors acts as a "gatekeeper." See Wayne 0. Hanewicz, When Silence is Golden: Why
the Business Judgment Rule Should Apply to No-Shops in Stock-for-Stock Merger
Agreements, 28 IOWA J. CORP. L. 205, 216 (2003).
21 See Matheson & Olson, supra note 19, at 1434 (stating that board of directors has
"ability to short-circuit fundamental changes, or, from a different perspective, [protect]
the shareholders from the burdens of important decisions until their duly elected
representatives have carefully considered the matter and have decided such a change is in
the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders"); see also Hanewicz, supra note
20, at 238 (explaining that board of directors has broad power to unilaterally terminate a
merger without shareholder approval).
22 See Matheson & Olson, supra note 19, at 1455-56 (stating that directors owe
fiduciary duty to shareholders to act in their best interests); see also Mark J. Loewenstein,
The SEC and the Future of Corporate Governance, 45 ALA. L. REV. 783, 788 (1994) (stating
that state law relies on principle that directors are fiduciaries who can be held liable to
shareholders for failing to perform their fiduciary duties).
23 See Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 822 (N.J. 1981) (stating that
directors must monitor corporate affairs and policies); see also In Re Caremark Int'l.
Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996) (suggesting, in aspirational
settlement opinion, that board of directors should create information and reporting
system to ensure compliance with applicable legal standards). See generally Matheson &
Olson, supra note 19, at 1460 (stating that "directors must act in accordance with their
fundamental duties of care and loyalty").
24 See Arthur R. Pinto, Corporate Governance: Monitoring the Board of Directors in
American Corporations, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 317, 334 (1998) (detailing breadth of corporate
disclosure requirements); see also J. Robert Brown, Jr., Corporate Secrecy, the Federal
Securities Laws, and the Disclosure of Ongoing Negotiations, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 93, 103-
06 (1986) (listing SEC-imposed disclosure requirements).
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Lastly, in the context of takeovers, directors owe additional
fiduciary duties. 25  Directors are obligated to protect the
corporation and may launch takeover defense mechanisms;
however, they must be able to prove that such defensive
measures are the products of rational decision making processes
and are proportional to the threats posed by the hostile bidder.26
Further, when it is evident that takeovers will inevitably result
in the sale and breakup of the corporation, the board is legally
mandated to seek out the deal that will yield shareholders the
most financial gain.2 7
A. The Fiduciary Duty of Care
The traditional purpose of the board of directors is to ensure
that corporate decisions benefit shareholder interests and
monitor managers in accordance with this goal.28 Based on this
purpose, directors owe fiduciary duties to the corporation's
shareholders. These fiduciary duties include the duty of care, 29
25 See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 181 (Del.
1985) (holding that, when confronted with imminent takeover, board is held to duties
articulated in Unocal, specifically "duty to determine the best interests of the corporation
and its stockholders, and impose an enhanced duty to abjure any action that is
motivated by considerations other than a good faith concern for such interests"); see also
Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 48-49 (Del. 1994)
(explaining how once "the Paramount directors.., decided to sell control, they had an
obligation to search for the best value reasonably available to stockholders"). See generally
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 (Del. 1989)
(discussing how, when evaluating a threat posed by a takeover bid, directors may consider
"inadequacy of the price offered, nature and timing of the offer, questions of illegality, the
impact on 'constituencies' other than shareholders, the risk of nonconsummation and the
quality of securities being offered in the exchange").
26 See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Corp., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (positing
that "[i]f a defensive measure is to come within the ambit of the business judgment rule, it
must be reasonable in relation to the threat posed"); see also Revlon, 506 A.2d at 179
(holding that, "[t]he ultimate responsibility for managing the business and affairs of a
corporation falls on its board of directors").
27 See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 184 (holding that when takeover is inevitable, board must
allow market forces to operate freely to ensure that shareholders will receive best price
available for their equity); see also Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (Del. 1985) (explaining how
director's duty, while extended to interests of shareholders, is not absolute).
28 See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182 (holding that board directors cannot abandon their
duties of loyalty to shareholders); see also Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956 (discussing importance
of protecting shareholders).
29 See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 874 (Del. 1985) (discussing how director
did not meet his requisite duty of care); see also Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970 (holding that
directors owe obligation to make good faith attempt to assure that corporation
information and reporting system exists).
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duty of loyalty, 30 and duty of good faith.31 This Note focuses on
the director's duty of care.
Directors owe a fiduciary duty of care to the corporation and its
shareholders. 32 In general, the duty of care requires a director to
exercise "that degree of diligence, care, and skill which ordinarily
prudent men would exercise under similar circumstances in like
positions."33 With respect to mergers and acquisitions, the board
members must "act in an informed and deliberate manner in
determining whether to approve an agreement of merger before
submitting it to shareholders." 34 The duty of care is essentially a
procedural obligation. In most cases, absent any showing of
improper procedure in the decision-making process, the board's
decision is protected by the business judgment rule.35
30 See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 179 (discussing how directors, in discharging ultimate
responsibility for managing business affairs owe fiduciary duty of loyalty to corporation
and its shareholders); see also Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1944)
(positing that directors are fiduciaries who owe a duty of loyalty to the shareholders).
31 See Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90 (Del. 2001) (stating that "[t]he
directors of Delaware corporations have a triad of primary fiduciary duties: due care,
loyalty, and good faith"). See generally Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 12 (Del. 1998)
(noting that the Court sought to "provide the directors with clear signal beacons and
brightly lined-channel markers as they navigate with due care, good faith, and loyalty on
behalf of a Delaware corporation and its shareholders").
32 See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 256 (Del. 2000) (commenting that good
corporate governance include compliance with fiduciary duties established by law);
Jernberg v. Mann, 358 F.3d 131, 135-36 (1st Cir. 2004) (noting a director owes a fiduciary
duty of fair dealing in respect to corporate actions).
33 Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 821 (N.J. 1981) (noting nature and
extent of duties depend on type of corporation, and size).
34 In particular, General Corporation Law, 8 DEL. CODE ANN. § 251(b) (2005), states
in pertinent part:
(b) The board of directors of each corporation, which desires to merge or consolidate,
shall adopt a resolution approving an agreement of merger or consolidation. The
agreement shall state: (1) the terms and conditions of the merger or consolidation; (2)
the mode of carrying the same into effect; (3) such amendments or changes in the
certificate of incorporation of the surviving corporation as are desired to be effected
by the merger or consolidation, or, if no such amendments or changes are desired, a
statement that the certificate of incorporation of one of the constituent corporations
shall be the certificate of incorporation of the surviving or resulting corporation; (4)
the manner of converting the shares of each of the constituent corporations ... and
(5) such other details or provisions as are deemed desirable .... The agreement so
adopted shall be executed in accordance with section 103 of this title. Any of the
terms of the agreement of merger or consolidation may be made dependent upon facts
ascertainable outside of such agreement, provided that the manner in which such
facts shall operate upon the terms of the agreement is clearly and expressly set forth
in the agreement of merger or consolidation.
Id. (emphasis added). Additionally, a director may not relinquish such duty by allowing
the shareholders to decide. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 at 874.
35 See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (highlighting that "[t]he
business judgment rule exists to protect and promote the full and free exercise of the
managerial power granted to Delaware directors"); see also Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 181 (Del. 1985) (noting that, under business
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There are two corporate governance philosophies underlying
the director's duty of care. First, the duty of care is built upon
the "judicial view of rational decision-making". 36 Under the
judicial view of rational decision-making, courts give
considerable deference to the presumed rationality of board
decisions based on the theory that judges are not adequately
competent to question or criticize the generally complex
substantive business decisions made by directors. 37 Thus, so long
as directors employ a systematic and thorough decision making
process, courts will trust that their decisions are rational. 38
Generally, courts intrude upon a board's substantive decision
only when it appears that directors might follow their own
financial self-interest at the expense of the corporation or its
shareholders. 39 This intervention is justified, according to courts,
because the directors' actions are inconsistent with the
shareholder primacy model.40
The shareholder primacy model is an additional theory upon
which directors' fiduciary duties are based.41 This model of
corporate law defines maximizing shareholder wealth as the
judgment rule, "there is a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of
a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the
action taken was in the best interests of the company").
36 See James A. Fanto, Quasi-Rationality in Action: A Study of Psychological Factors
in Merger Decision-Making, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1333, 1386 (2001).
37 See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 181 (noting presumption that directors acted in best
interest of company); see also Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872 (discussing importance of
preserving directors' managerial powers).
38 See Fanto, supra note 36, at 1386 (highlighting that judges understand
complexities of business decisions); see also Harbor Finance Partners v. Huizenga, 751
A.2d 879, 901 (Del. 1999) (finding that "[iut seems presumptuous and paternalistic to
assume that the court knows better in a particular instance than a fully informed
corporate electorate with real money riding on the corporation's performance").
39 See Kamin v. American Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 812 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (noting
court will not interfere with boards' decision unless a case of fraud, oppression, arbitrary
action, or breach of trust is made out), affd, 387 N.Y.S.2d 993 (App. Div. 1976); see also
Fanto, supra note 36, at 1382 (stating that in mergers board behavior is instrumentally
rational).
40 See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (stating that
corporations exist for "the profit of the stockholders"); Johnathan D. Springer, Corporate
Law Corporate Constituency Statutes: Hollow Hopes and False Fears, 1999 ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 85, 87 (1999) (noting that shareholder primacy model has usually prevailed in
litigation).
41 See Gabaldon, supra note 4, at 835-37 (noting managers are agents of shareholders
and that shareholder primacy model is based on conclusion that "the interests of
shareholders are preferred over those of others with interests in the firm"). See generally
Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why Corporate Officers are Fiduciaries,
46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597, 1643 (2005) (stating that "the board should attend first and
foremost to interests of shareholders").
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director's primary function.42 Under the shareholder primacy
model, directors must act in the best interests of shareholders.
Thus, so long as directors make decisions in accordance with this
profit maximization goal, they satisfy their duty of care.43
Under the shareholder primacy model, directors are under no
legal obligation to consider the interests of any other
stakeholders in the corporation, including employees, suppliers,
or members of the community.44 Under state corporate law,
directors are generally not held liable for decisions that
negatively impact non-shareholder constituencies. 45
1. The Duty of Care: Grossly-Negligent Decision Making
Directors can breach their duty of care in two ways: 1) through
grossly negligent decision making46 or 2) by failing to monitor
compliance with legal obligations.47 A director makes a grossly
negligent decision when she fails to reasonably investigate and
duly deliberate before making a decision. 48 Due deliberation is
not specifically defined in the pertinent case law; however, in the
merger and acquisition context, directors must inform
themselves about the merger and make a rational business
42 See Kamin, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 812 (finding that "[aill directors have an obligation,
using sound business judgment, to maximize income for the benefit of all persons having
a stake in the welfare of the corporate entity..."); see also Gabaldon, supra note 4, at
835-36 (noting shareholders' interest is preferred above all others).
43 See Gabaldon, supra note 4, at 835-37 (noting directors are responsible for
maximizing value for shareholders). See generally Johnson & Millon, supra note 41, at
1647-49 (noting strong need for fiduciary duty to supplement need to monitor agents).
44 See Johnson & Millon, supra note 41, at 1643-45 (stating whenever a conflict
between interests of shareholders and non-shareholders arise directors should only
consider shareholders' interests). See generally Gabaldon, supra note 4, at 836-37 (noting
only those that have interaction with corporation are stakeholders).
45 See Johnson & Millon, supra note 41, at 1643 (positing that recent doctrinal
developments suggesting that directors should, at least, be permitted to consider the well
being of non-shareholders). See generally Gabaldon, supra note 4, at 1643-1645 (noting
that "[ilt is easy to understand... why little attention needs to be devoted to external
law" in light of the fact that "those who have no interaction with a corporation or its
products are likely to be regarded as non-stakeholders").
46 See Kamin v. American Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 811 (Sup. Ct. 1976), affd,
387 N.Y.S.2d 993 (App. Div. 1976) (stating directors are not chargeable with ordinary
negligence); see also Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985) (confirming
gross negligence is proper standard for determining fault).
47 See Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 822-23 (N.J. 1981) (charging
directors with duty to keep informed); see also In Re: Caremark Int'l. Derivative Litig.,
698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996) (stating breach of duty may arise in two ways).
48 See Francis, 432 A.2d at 822 (explaining that director's duty to not make a grossly
negligent decision requires her to have "at least a rudimentary understanding of business
of corporation" or, in other words, to become familiar with the fundamentals of
corporation's business).
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decision that, if recommended, will benefit the corporation and
its shareholders.49 Before a merger is completed, the corporate
officers promote it, the directors recommend it or decline to
recommend it to shareholders, and, in the instance the merger
proposal gets the board's approval, the shareholders vote on it.50
Because the ultimate decision must be made by the corporation's
shareholders, the directors have a duty to disclose to the
shareholders all material information necessary for the
shareholders to make a competent decision. 51
Courts are generally deferential to a board's decision so long as
the board does not "totally overlook facts called to their
attention."52  Whether a court feels a board's decision is
substantively wrong does not provide grounds for director
liability. 53 If a court finds that the process undertaken by the
board was "rational" and "employed in a good faith effort to
49 See Kamin, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 810-13. In Kamin, the court found that the board of
directors did not breach its duty of care when it made a decision to issue dividends in kind
as opposed to selling shares in the corporation. Id. at 810. Shareholders argued that the
board breached its duty of care because the decision to issue dividends in kind resulted in
adverse tax consequences for the corporation. Id. The Kamin court did not analyze
whether the board's decision was substantively sound; instead, it held in favor of the
directors because they informed themselves of the adverse tax consequences before
making the decision, carefully considered and unanimously rejected the action proposed
by the shareholders at a special memorialized formal meeting, and discussed other factors
which led them to their decision. Id.; see also James A. Fanto, Braking the Merger
Momentum: Reforming Corporate Law Governing Mega.Mergers, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 249,
306 (2001). Fanto argues that corporate law, by imposing fiduciary duties, strengthens
the decision-making of the board. Id.
50 See Barris Industries, Inc. v. Bryan, 686 F.Supp. 125, 130 (E.D. Va. 1988) (noting
that Virginia law requires that no shareholder voting take place on merger proposals
until the board of directors has drafted formal merger plan and submitted it to
shareholders); see also Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. Western Resources, 939 F. Supp.
688, 689 (W.D. Mo. 1996) (discussing that certain forms of mergers are allowed, but only
after shareholder vote).
51 See Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 14 (Del. 1998) (discussing how Delaware law
allows shareholders to sue directors who deliberately misinform them about the business
of corporation); see also Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 741 A.2d 377, 388 (Del.
Ch. 1999) (noting that the board of directors of a corporation owe a "fiduciary duty of
disclosure" to stockholders when they seek stockholder action).
52 See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 881 (Del. 1985) (holding that directors
liable for breach of their duty of care because board entered into merger without
gathering all pertinent information regarding monetary value of deal and without
providing shareholders with information necessary to give informed approval of
recommendation); see also Kamin v. American Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 811 (Sup.
Ct. 1976) (finding that plaintiffs must do more than simply allege that directors made
imprudent decision in order to win judgment in court).
53 See In Re Caremark Int'l. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 968 (Del. Ch. 1996)
(noting that "[w]here a director in fact exercises a good faith effort to be informed and to
exercise appropriate judgment, he or she should be deemed to have satisfied the duty of
attention").
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advance corporate interests," board members will generally not
be held personally liable for a duty of care breach based on
grossly negligent decision-making. 54
2. The Duty of Care: The Duty to Monitor
Historically, a board's duty of care only included the duty not
to engage in grossly negligent decision making. 55 However, In re
Caremark International, Inc. Derivative Litigation established
that corporate directors can also be held personally liable for
failing to adequately "[monitor] ... the enterprise to assure that
the corporation functions within the law to achieve its [business
goals] ."56 This aspect of the director's duty of care has become
known as the duty to monitor.5 7
A determination regarding whether a board has breached its
duty to monitor is fact intensive. Caremark provides guidance as
to' the factors used by courts in determining whether a duty to
monitor breach has occurred.58 Caremark, a managed-care
healthcare provider that received reimbursements from Medicare
and Medicaid, was investigated for possible Anti-Referral
Payments Law (ARPL) violations in 1991.59 After learning of the
violations, Caremark officers instituted a program that provided
greater supervision of its 7000 employees and several revisions to
54 See Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967. State corporate law statutes such as Delaware
General Corporation Law § 102(b)(7) also make it difficult for shareholders to hold
directors liable for duty of care breaches. See 8 Del. Code. Ann. § 102(b)(7) (2005). In
particular, Section 102(b)(7) provides that a company's certificate of incorporation may
contain a provision limiting a director's liability for her breach of fiduciary duty as long as
the provision does not limit her liability for breach of her duty of loyalty or good faith. See
Arthur B. Laby, Resolving Conflicts of Duty in Fiduciary Relationships, 54 AM. U.L. REV.
75, 148 (2004).
55 See Watson, supra note 3, at 16 (highlighting that "[b]efore Caremark, a corporate
director's duty of care was widely interpreted as having been fulfilled so long as the
director did not engage in outlandish acts of neglect."); see also Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at
873 (holding that, in determining whether a boards decision was informed, the gross
negligence standard should be applied).
56 Caremark, 698 A.2d at 969.
57 See Primo Fontana, Comment, CERCLA Derivative Suits, 27 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 741, 746 (2000) (positing that "In re Caremark International Derivative Litigation
has led some to believe that directors and officers may have an affirmative 'duty to
monitor' the behavior of subordinate employees"). See generally Watson, supra note 3, at
19 (noting that this breach of the duty of care is also referred to as an active breach).
58 It is important to note that because Caremark was a settlement decision, it has no
precedential value and remains only aspirational.
59 See Watson, supra note 3, at 16 (noting that ARPL prohibits healthcare companies
from making payments in exchange for Medicare and Medicaid patient referrals).
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its internal compliance manual.60 It received reports from an
outside auditor stating that there were no "material weaknesses
in Caremark's conflict control structure," and appointed a
compliance officer. 61 In addition, Caremark's board kept careful
meeting minutes, reflecting that it was "aware of Caremark's
various efforts to assure compliance with the ARPL and other
kickback laws."62
Despite its best reform efforts, Caremark was indicted by a
federal grand jury. Following the indictment, five separate
shareholder derivative actions were filed against Caremark's
directors.6 3 Caremark entered a proposed settlement agreement
in the shareholder derivative suits which required the Delaware
Chancery Court's approval.64  In determining whether the
settlement was reasonable, the court needed to address the
shareholder's claim and ask whether Caremark had breached its
duty to actively monitor Caremark's corporate performance by
allowing a situation to develop which exposed it to enormous
legal liability. 65
While such a duty to monitor had not been recognized in the
past, the Delaware court held that a director's obligation includes
a duty to attempt in good faith to assure that an adequate
corporate information and reporting system exists. 66 It added
that a director's failure to do so could render the director liable
for losses caused by non-compliance with applicable legal
standards. 67 Elaborating on this standard, the court stated that
60 See Watson, supra note 3, at 17 (stating that these changes took place both before
and during investigations into Caremark).
61 Watson, supra note 3, at 17.
62 Watson, supra note 3, at 17.
63 See In Re Caremark Int'l. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996)
(commenting on shareholder derivative claims of director fault); see also Watson, supra
note 3, at 17 (noting that five stockholder derivative actions were filed in Delaware
Chancery Court).
64 Caremark, 698 A.2d at 972.
65 See id. at 967 (noting that director may breach duty of care and liability may
attach from "an unconsidered failure of the board to act in circumstances in which due
attention would have arguably prevented the loss").
66 See id. at 969-70 (holding that board must use its good faith judgment to ensure
that information will come to it in timely manner so that it may satisfy its obligations to
corporation).
67 See id. at 970 (finding that "a director's obligation includes a duty to attempt in
good faith to assure that a corporate information and reporting system, which the board
concludes is adequate, exists, and that failure to do so under some circumstances may, in
theory at least, render[s] a director liable for losses caused by non-compliance with
applicable legal standards").
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the system must be timely and accurate, must contain legal
compliance and business performance information, and must
enable information to flow to the board in the ordinary course of
business. 68 In conclusion, the court determined that Caremark's
compliance program met the enumerated standard and thereby
found that the directors had not breached their duty to monitor.
It resultantly also approved the board's settlement agreement. 69
Extrapolating from the standard articulated in Caremark, it
appears that a board will not be held to breach its duty of care for
failure to monitor if it undertakes a reasonable investigation,
duly deliberates, and concludes that the establishment of a
compliance program is not in the shareholders' best interests. In
other words, it seems that if the board undertakes a cost-benefit
analysis and finds that the likelihood of its employees violating
applicable law multiplied by the cost of fines associated with
violations of the law is less costly than installing an efficient
compliance system, a court will defer to the board's decision.
Thus, it is asserted that the duty to monitor can also be satisfied
by a board's decision not to install a compliance program. In this
regard, it is suggested that the company's bottom line, or
economic interest, in ensuring compliance with the law
determines whether the board will strictly monitor compliance
with the law.
B. The Unocal and Revlon Duties
When a corporation decides to engage in a "mergers of equals,"
a merger in which both companies retain their shareholders,
directors are only legally obligated to comply with their
traditional fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and good faith.70
68 See id. (elaborating on meaning of "adequate," board noted that system should be
"reasonably designed to provide to senior management and the board itself timely,
accurate information sufficient to allow management and the board, each within its scope,
to reach informed judgments concerning both the corporation's compliance with law and
its business performance").
69 See In Re Caremark Int'l. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 972 (Del. Ch. 1996)
(stating that proposed settlement "appears to be an adequate, reasonable, and beneficial
outcome for all of the parties").
70 See Fanto, supra note 36, at 1338 (likening merger of equals to partnership); see
also Janet E. Kerr, Delaware Goes Shopping For a "New" Interpretation of the Revlon
Standard: The Effect of the QVC Decision on Strategic Mergers, 58 ALB. L. REV. 609, 611
n. 10 (1995) (quoting Lou R. KLING & EILEEN NUGENT SIMON, NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS
OF COMPANIES, SUBSIDIARIES, AND DIVISIONS 22.011] (1994) and describing merger of
equals as when "two companies of approximately the same size combine in a stock-for-
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However, many acquisitions are not amicable deals and occur in
the form of takeovers. 71 In the context of takeovers, a board's
legal duties are compounded. 72
When a board decides it is going to take defensive measures to
protect a corporation from an unwanted takeover bid, it must
abide by, what are called, Unocal duties;73 directors must be able
to prove that they responded to a takeover bid in good faith and
after reasonable investigation and that the response they
adopted was proportionate to the threat posed by hostile
bidder.74
The Unocal duties are also a product of the shareholder
primacy approach to corporate governance. 75 Liability attaches to
the board only when shareholders can first prove that the
directors' interests in the transaction were conflicted - that the
directors' decision to defend against the takeover was primarily
motivated by pecuniary self-interest.76 Courts will not scrutinize
stock exchange with the ratio based upon their relative size or upon the ratio of their
unaffected trading prices").
71 See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del.
1989) (noting the existence of hostile tender offers); see also Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 176 (Del. 1985) (commenting on the circumstances
surrounding a takeover threat).
72 See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34, 42 (Del. 1994)
(stating that enhanced scrutiny of directors' conduct will occur when conduct embodies
measures in response to threat of corporate control); see also Time, 571 A.2d at 1150-51
(discussing responsibilities of board in the event of takeover); Revlon, 506 A.2d at 180
(emphasizing that the business judgment rule is applicable to the decisions of directors
responding to takeover threats provided that the principles of care, loyalty, and
independence are satisfied). See generally Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Corp., 493
A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (explaining that when faced with pending takeover, the actions
of the board are subjected to judicial examination before protection of business judgment
rule is conferred).
73 See Time, 571 A.2d at 1151 (referring to an analysis of whether there was a proper
exercise of business judgment); see also Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956 (delineating the duties).
74 See QVC, 637 A.2d at 45 (stating that directors must show they were adequately
informed and acted reasonably); see also Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (explaining that
directors satisfy burden of showing they had reasonable grounds for making decision "by
showing good faith and reasonable investigation").
75 See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956 (stating that "minority stockholder shall receive the
substantial equivalent in value of what he had before"); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Pre-commitment Strategies in Corporate Law: The Case of Dead Hand and No Hand Pills,
29 IOWA J. CORP. L. 1, 35 n.276 (2003) (arguing that Unocal duties and shareholder
primacy are compatible). But see Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production
Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 308 (1999) (arguing that Unocal "squarely
rejects shareholder primacy in favor of the view that the interests of the 'corporation'
include the interests of non-shareholder constituencies").
76 See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956 (ruling that board's decision to fight Mesa was not
primarily motivated by pecuniary self-interest); see also Kerr, supra note 70, at 637 (1995)
(noting that in absence of self-interest, the actions of an independent board are protected
by the business judgment rule, provided that the Unocal duties are met).
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the director's business decisions in the takeover context unless
there exists a judicial concern that board members may be
focusing more on maintaining their board positions than on
shareholder interests.77
Under the Unocal duties, directors are entitled to consider the
impact of its decision on non-shareholder constituencies, but they
are obligated only to act in the best interest of shareholders. 78
Thus, boards cannot justify their takeover defense mechanisms if
they do not further the shareholder profit maximization goal,
even if they are in the best interest of non-shareholder
constituencies.79
In addition to Unocal duties, directors owe further duties to
shareholders when the sale or break up of the company becomes
inevitable.80 In this case, the duty of the board81 switches from
protecting the corporation to maximizing the sale price (the short
term profits) for shareholders.8 2 Again, the rationale beneath this
77 See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 958 (ruling that "unless it is shown by a preponderance of
the evidence that the director's decisions were based on perpetuating themselves in office"
court will not substitute its own judgment for board's judgment); see also Charles M.
Elson, The Duty of Care, Compensation, and Stock Ownership, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 649,
656-57 (1995) (describing "captured board" syndrome and its relation to board member
priorities).
78 See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Corp., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (stating
that "corporate directors have a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the
corporation's stockholders"); see also Robert E. Bull, Note, Directors' Responsibilities and
Shareholders' Interests in the Aftermath of Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc., 65
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 885, 914 n.214 (1989) (arguing that directors are supposed to make
business decisions in shareholders' best interest).
79 See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (announcing that boards must act in the best interest
of their stockholders.); see also Cheryl L. Wade, For-Profit Corporations that Perform
Public Functions: Politics, Profit, and Poverty, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 323, 331 (1999) (noting
that many scholars believe that "the responsibilities of corporate managers do not extend
beyond shareholder interests").
80 See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del.
1985) (holding that when takeover is inevitable the board must allow market forces to
operate freely to ensure that shareholders will receive their best price available for their
equity). See generally Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34, 43
(Del. 1994) (finding that the sale and break-up of the company was deemed inevitable
when QVC entered into a merger where change of control would take place).
81 See Kerr, supra note 70, at 620 (noting that "the duty of the board of directors to
maximize share value is now referred to as the Revlon duty"); see also Wells M. Engledow,
Structuring Corporate Board Action to Meet the Ever-Decreasing Scope of Revlon Duties,
63 ALB. L. REV. 505, 505 (1999) (highlighting that Revlon held that when sale or breakup
of the corporation becomes inevitable, board's primary function shifts to maximizing sale
value of the company).
82 See Douglas G. Baird, The New Face of Chapter 11, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 69,
75 n.29 (2004) (noting the duty to maximize stockholder value when a takeover or break-
up of a company becomes inevitable); see also Brian K. Kidd, Note, The Need for Stricter
Scrutiny: Application of the Revlon Standard to the Use of Standstill Agreements, 24
CARDOZO L. REV. 2517, 2542 (2003) (discussing Revlon's holding that "once the sale of a
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duty is based on the shareholder primacy model. Directors must,
above all else, act to maximize profits for shareholders.8 3
Shareholder primacy is even more pronounced in this context
given that when the sale and break-up of the corporation
becomes inevitable, directors are actually prohibited from
considering non-shareholder interests.8 4
C. Federal Regulations Applicable to Directors in M&A Context
As state corporate laws require that directors disclose to
shareholders all relevant information regarding mergers and
acquisitions so that shareholders may competently decide
whether to approve the proposed merger, federal securities laws
also place great emphasize on informed decision-making in public
companies.8 5 Specifically, under the federal proxy rules, public
companies must solicit shareholder votes in a systemized manner
and disclose to the shareholders considerable information about
"the transaction, the parties involved, the reasons for it, its risks
and the merger consideration." 86 The federal rules also demand
that the corporation give its shareholders adequate time to
consider the merger before casting their votes.8 7
corporation becomes inevitable, the target board has a duty to conduct a fair bidding
auction and obtain the highest possible sale price for the corporation").
83 See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182 (stating that when breakup or sale becomes inevitable,
duty of board becomes "maximization of the company's value at a sale for the
stockholders' benefit"); see also Nancy A. Peterman & Sherri Morissette, Director's Duties
in the Zone of Insolvency: The Quandary of the Nonprofit Corp., 23-2 AM. BANKR. INST. J.
12, 12 (2004) (stating that in general, board of directors "only owes a fiduciary duty to its
shareholders to maximize profits and shareholder wealth").
84 See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 176 (ruling that actions taken by directors during takeover
threat require "rationally related benefit accruing to the stockholders"); see also Wai Shun
Wilson Leung, The Inadequacy of Shareholder Primacy: A Proposed Corporate Regime
that Recognizes Non-Shareholder Interests, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 587, 611 (1997)
(describing shareholders' interests as paramount in hierarchy of board priorities).
85 See Arthur R. Pinto, Corporate Governance: Monitoring the Board of Directors in
American Corporations, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 317, 334 (1998) (detailing breadth of corporate
disclosure requirements); see also J. Robert Brown, Jr., Corporate Secrecy, the Federal
Securities Laws, and the Disclosure of Ongoing Negotiations, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 93, 103-
06 (1986) (listing SEC-imposed disclosure requirements).
86 See Fanto, supra note 49, at 307 (listing the information required for disclosure
under the Federal Proxy Rules); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (2005) (governing the
solicitation of proxies); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2 (2005) (listing types of solicitations federal
regulations apply to).
87 Under federal proxy rules, "shareholders [must] receive considerable disclosure
about the transaction, the parties involved, the reasons for it, its risks and the merger
consideration, as well as have time to evaluate the information and to decide whether to
cast their vote in support of the merger." See Fanto, supra note 49, at 307. Specifically, 15
U.S.C. 78n(c) provides, in relevant part:
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II. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY AND SEXUAL DISCRIMINATION
LITIGATION
A. The Emerging Trend in Employment Discrimination
Litigation
The corporate accounting scandals of 2002 received maximum
media attention. Company names such as Enron, WorldCom,
Tyco, and Arthur Anderson were thrust onto front-page news and
into the public discourse. Conversely, the problem of racial and
sexual discrimination in the corporate workplace has received
considerably less public attention though it has been a major
issue facing women and minorities for centuries.88 Recently,
however, there has been a significant rise in employment
litigation8 9 and legal and human resource experts predict that
the number of lawsuits will increase exponentially.90 Specifically,
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce's litigation center has estimated
Information to holders of record prior to annual or other meeting. Unless proxies,
consents, or authorizations in respect of a security registered pursuant to section 12
of this title [15 USCS § 781], or a security issued by an investment company
registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 [15 USCS §§ 80a-1 et seq.], are
solicited by or on behalf of the management of the issuer from the holders of record of
such security in accordance with the rules and regulations prescribed under
subsection (a) of this section, prior to any annual or other meeting of the holders of
such security, such issuer shall, in accordance with rules and regulations prescribed
by the Commission, file with the Commission and transmit to all holders of record of
such security information substantially equivalent to the information which would be
required to be transmitted if a solicitation were made, but no information shall be
required to be filed or transmitted pursuant to this subsection before July 1, 1964.
15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (2005).
88 See, Joe R. Feagin et. al., The Many Costs of Discrimination: The Case of Middle-
Class African Americans, 34 IND. L. REV. 1313, 1343 (2001) (noting lack of media
attention on workplace discrimination even though victims of such suffer psychological
harm in addition to real harm of non-promotion). See generally Rosemary Barnes, Still On
The Outside, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS NEWS, April 2, 2005, at 10H (quoting Wesley Poriotis,
chairman of Wesley, Brown, Bartle & Roldan, leading minority executive recruitment
firm based in New York as stating that "[iut's been this sad, same story for 30 years. What
we hear from corporations is that diversity is important, but not for critical positions").
89 See Wade, supra note 8, at 225 (proposing that increase of litigation is due to
increased willingness of employees and shareholder activists to litigate discrimination
issues); see also Morris et al., supra note 9, at 65-72 (noting that companies are
vulnerable to sex-discrimination lawsuits and advising companies to adopt consistent
procedures and established guidelines for employee advancement in order to prevent
overbearing litigation).
90 See Morris et al., supra note 9, at 66 (citing AFL-CIO survey as concluding that the
critical mass of career women, now reaching their 40's, are becoming increasingly
frustrated with the disparities between men and women's pay in corporate employment;
thus increasing litigation is natural result). See generally Wade, supra note 8, at 225
(asserting that dramatic rise in amounts paid to settle discrimination claims has played
role in bolstering shareholder activism).
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that such employment lawsuits will cost corporations "billions
and billions of dollars."91 Due to this trend, disturbing practices
that corporations would like to keep secret (namely, methods
used to reward workers, determine entry-level salaries, make
promotions and layoff decisions, and divvy up merit raises) have
become more readily scrutinized; thus, the need for corporate
reform in terms of diversity is urgent. 92
B. The Development of the Civil Right to Equal Employment
In order to understand the importance of the recent success
that women and minorities have been experiencing in asserting
their rights to equal employment, a brief historical review is
necessary. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the '64 Act") made it
illegal for employers to discriminate on the basis of race, creed,
and sex.93 Furthermore, it provided for the establishment of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC").94 The '64
Act also required that any company with 100 employees or more
file annual accounts of the number of women and minorities it
had at all levels of the organization. 95
91 See Morris et al., supra note 9, at 66 (quoting a recently filed brief by U.S.
Chamber of Commerce litigation center in support of Wal-Mart's appeal of class-action
certification of its lawsuit estimates damage somewhere in "billions and billions of
dollars."); see also Wade, supra note 8, at 225 (describing "meteoric rise in amounts paid
to settle discrimination claims").
92 See Morris et al., supra note 9, at 66 (highlighting that traditionally such practices
were kept quiet as internal complaints were inconspicuously handled by management, in
contrast with today's threat of sex discrimination cases which has been described as "one
of corporate America's worst nightmares"); see also Tristin K. Green, Work Culture and
Discrimination, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 623, 664 (2005) (positing that, in light of discriminatory
potential of work culture, there should at least be modest reform in the way courts and
litigants think about traditional discrimination claims).
93 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2005) (stating that "[iut shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer ... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race ... religion
[and] sex ... ").
94 See Francis Achampong, Policy Implications of Rules Governing Harassment and
Discrimination Complaints in Private and Federal Employment, 20 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP.
L.J. 51, 54 (2002) (examining role of EEOC under Civil Rights Act of 1964); see also
Marjorie A Silver, The Uses and Abuses of Informal Procedures in Federal Civil Rights
Enforcement, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 482, 485 (1987) (positing that "[tlhe passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (1964 Act) marked a turning point in this country's political
commitment to the eradication of discrimination against women and minorities").
95 See Michael J Zimmer, Systematic Empathy, 34 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV.
575, 603 n.124 (2003) (noting that EEO-1 Form requires that private employers with one
hundred or more employees compile gender, race, and ethnicity information about their
employees, as mandated by the Civil Rights Act of 1964); see also John B. Moretta, Just
Who Is An Applicant?: The Impact of Electronic Resumes and Job Search Engines on
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Although the EEOC acquired large settlements through sex
discrimination claims against AT&T in the 1970's, the
conservative Reagan-era courts rarely certified class-action
lawsuits and made it more difficult to prove sex-discrimination. 96
After a significant growth in civil rights and women's' activism
groups, Congress passed The Civil Rights Act of 1991 ("the '91
Act") which allowed for substantial punitive damages against
companies that discriminated by gender.97 The '91 Act made it
easier for women to file sex discrimination charges. 98 Notably,
not much employment litigation occurred during the economic
boom of the 1990's. 99 However, by the end of the decade, multi-
million dollar settlements were being awarded to classes of
plaintiffs by major corporations.O0 In 1999, the SEC further
enhanced the rights of employment discrimination claimants by
prohibiting firms from requiring that their employees sign
private contracts binding them to arbitrate civil rights claims.101
Employment Discrimination Law, 2 J. HIGH TECH. L. 123, 138 (2003) (highlighting that
"penalties for failure to file a report or for falsifying a report are extensive and severe").
96 See Morris et al., supra note 9, at 66 (highlighting how "[iun the '80s the EEOC ...
became less feisty; conservative Reagan-era courts all but eliminated the class-action suit
and made it much tougher to prove sex discrimination"); see also Douglas M.
Staudmeister, Comment, Grasping the Intangible: A Guide to Assessing Nonpecuniary
Damages in the EEOC Administrative Process, 46 AM. U.L. REV. 189, 195 (1996)
(suggesting that the judiciary had retreated from previous advances in civil rights and
EEO jurisprudence).
97 See Melissa Hart, Will Employment Discrimination Class Actions Survive?, 37
AKRON L. REV. 813, 814 (2004) (positing that "[t]he addition of compensatory and punitive
damages and a jury-trial right in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 may increase the level of
scrutiny and perhaps the level of judicial involvement necessary in an employment
discrimination class action"); see also Morris et al., supra note 9, at 71 (stating that the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 allowed for substantial punitive damages against companies that
discriminated by gender).
98 See Achampong, supra note 94, at 55-72 (examining the modern formalized process
of the EEOC to deal with complaints of sexual discrimination from filing to appeal); see
also Staudmeister, supra note 96, at 201 (noting that there has been a dramatic increase
of litigation in the wake of the Civil Rights Act of 1991).
99 See John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, Law and Macroeconomics:
Employment Discrimination Litigation Over the Business Cycle, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 709,
725 (1993) (analyzing the statistical relationship between the business cycle and the
volume of federal employment discrimination case filings); see also Antilla, supra note 10,
at 19 (noting that employment discrimination suits increase during low economic
downturns).
100 See Morris et al., supra note 9, at 66 (highlighting settlements of Mitsubishi for
$34 million in 1996, Home Depot for $104.5 million in 1997, and American Express for
$42 million in 2002); see also Boeing Gives Details of Settlement of Sex-Bias Suit, N.Y.
TIMES, Jul. 17, 2004, at Cl, C4 (hereinafter Boeing Gives Details) (discussing the Boeing
settlement of $40.6 to $72.5 million).
101 See Antilla, supra note 10, at 19 (stating that in 1999 SEC changed rules to
prohibit mandatory arbitration for discrimination claims); see also Paul Revere Variable
Annuity Ins. Co. v. Kirschhofer, 226 F.3d 15, 19 n.5 (1st Cir. 2000) (stating that "NASD
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Today, employment discrimination lawsuits are being certified
as class actions with increased frequency and are resulting in
multi-million dollar settlements. The 2004 Boeing settlement
arose out of a lawsuit brought by women who contended they
were mistreated because of their sex. 102 The case was initiated in
2000 by female employees who claimed that Boeing allowed for
sexual intimidation and improper advances in the workplace and
alleged that Boeing paid women less for performing the same
duties as men. 103 The certified class could have included as many
as 29,000 former employees.O4 Boeing resultantly agreed to pay
the plaintiffs between $40.6 million to $72.5 million to settle the
class action.105 In addition, the settlement, preliminarily
approved by Judge Marsha A. Pechman of United States District
Court in Seattle, included changes in the way Boeing evaluates
employees for raises and promotions.106
In January 2005, Boeing's troubles only increased when the
same district court judge certified a class of former African
American Boeing employees asserting Title VII disparate impact
and disparate treatment claims. 0 7
Rule 10201 was amended to exempt statutory employment discrimination claims from
mandatory arbitration").
102 See Boeing Gives Details, supra note 100, at C4 (stating that female employees
who brought claim said Boeing tolerated sexual intimidation and improper advances in
workplace); see also Morris et al., supra note 9, at 66 (describing that female employees
claimed they were paid less and not promoted as quickly as their male counterparts).
103 See Morris et al., supra note 9, at 66 (highlighting that female employees who
brought claim said they were paid less and not promoted as quickly as males); see also
Boeing Gives Details, supra note 100, at C4 (stating that "case was first brought in
February 2000 by female employees who said that Boeing tolerated sexual intimidation
and improper advances in the workplace").
104 See Boeing Gives Details, supra note 100, at 4 (stating that Boeing claimed class
could number "as many as 29,000"); see also Christopher P. Reynolds & Richard W. Black,
The Increasing Risk of Legal Challenges to an Employer's Compensation Policies and
Practices: Considerations for Compensation Self-assessment, JOURNAL OF INVESTMENT
COMPLIANCE, March 22, 2005, at 55 (outlining Boeing's settlement with approximately
29,000 salaried and hourly female employees alleging discrimination).
105 See Boeing Gives Details, supra note 100, at 4 (stating such changes); Sex
Discrimination Suit is Settled by Boeing; Employment, NAT. L. J., July 26, 2004, at 16
(reporting that Boeing agreed to pay between $40.6 and $70.2 million).
106 See Boeing Gives Details, supra note 100, at 4 (stating that settlement included
changes in way Boeing evaluates workers for raises and promotions); see also Sex
Discrimination Suit is Settled by Boeing, supra note 105, at 16 (stating that settlement
required Boeing to "change the way it determines starting salaries, modify its
performance-evaluation tools and monitor salaries and overtime to reduce the risk of
gender discrimination").
107 See Williams v. Boeing Co., 225 F.R.D. 626 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 21, 2005) (certifying
class-action of African American employees against Boeing).
464 ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 20:2
The Wal-Mart sex discrimination class action based on huge
discrepancies in pay and promotion between the corporation's
male and female employees began in 1998 when a female
employee realized, after finding a W-2 form lying around the
Sam's Club in which she worked, that she was making $10,000
less per year than her male counterpart.108 When a federal
district court judge certified the class of plaintiffs in Dukes v.
Wal-Mart,l09 the largest discrimination suit in history was born,
covering 1.5 million current and former employees at every Wal-
Mart and Sam's Club store in the country. 110
Possibly the most prominent multi-million dollar settlement of
late is that which resolved the Wall Street women and EEOC's
class action sex discrimination suit against Morgan Stanley in
July 2004.111 While denying ever having presided over any
discrimination, Morgan Stanley agreed to pay the plaintiffs $54
million.112
III. DIVERSITY IN CORPORATE AMERICA
A. In General
Over forty years after the Civil Rights Act of 1964 made
discrimination on the basis of race, creed, and sex illegal,
employment discrimination is still a major issue in corporate
108 See Cora Daniels, Women vs. Wal-Mart: How Can the Retailer Reconcile Its
Storied Culture With the Anger of Some of its Female Employees?, FORTUNE, July 21,
2003, at 78 (discussing that Wal-Mart suit started after female assistant manager found
W-2 of male assistant manager who was making $10,000 more than her annually); see
also Morris et al., supra note 9, at 66 (highlighting fact that at Wal-Mart women make up
more than 72% of hourly workers but hold only about one third of management positions).
109 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. June 16, 2004).
110 See Benedict Sheehy, Corporations and Social Costs: The Wal-Mart Case Study,
24 J.L. & COM. 1, 39 (stating lawsuit was on behalf of 1.5 million former female
employees); see also Daniels, supra note 108, at 78 (stating Wal-Mart case would become
largest discrimination suit in history).
111 See Thomas Landon Jr., Morgan Names Official to Regulatory and Legal Areas,
N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2005, at Al (mentioning "humiliating $54 million sex discrimination
settlement"); see also Antilla, supra note 10, at 19 (discussing the $54 million settlement
between Morgan Stanley and class of 340 former and current female employees).
112 See Phyllis Furman, Wall Street Suit Nets $40M. Morgan Stanley Women To
Share Big Settlement, DAILY NEWS (NY), August 16, 2005, at 8 (reporting that 'Morgan
Stanley, which did not admit to any wrongdoing, agreed last year to pay a total of $54
million to settle the case"); see also Antilla, supra note 10, at A19 (noting $12 million went
to Allison Schieffelin whose claims led to the EEOC suit, $40 million to the 340 former
and current MS employees, and $2 million to the development of new diversity program).
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America.113 Particularly, the EEOC stated that in fiscal year
2004, it received 27,696 charges of race discrimination and
recovered $61.1 million in monetary benefits for charging parties
and other aggrieved individuals. 114 Currently, women hold half of
all management and professional jobs yet only 8% have achieved
executive vice president level or above at Fortune 500
companies.115 Moreover, both minorities and women who do
reach senior executive status are paid significantly less than
their white male counterparts.116 Based upon these alarming
statistics, it is evident that despite some companies' best efforts,
American public corporations, as a whole, are not "equal
opportunity employers."117
B. In the Context of Mergers and Acquisitions
The employment discrimination discussion becomes both more
complex and pressing in light of corporate America's current
merger wave. 118 From November 2004 to January 2005, U.S.
113 See Morris et al., supra note 9, at 64 (explaining that studies have shown women
in all job categories are still being paid less for doing same job as men). See generally
David Wilkins, From "Separate Is Inherently Unequal" to "Diversity is Good For
Business": The Rise of Market-Based Diversity Arguments And The Fate of the Black
Corporate Bar, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1548, 1551 (2004) (commenting that Supreme Court has
again had to turn its attention to race-related discrimination in matters regarding
affirmative action programs at the University of Michigan and its law school).
114 The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Race/Color
Discrimination, March 2, 2005, http://www.eeoc.gov/types/race.html (reporting that the
EEOC resolved 29,631 race charges in fiscal year 2004 and observed an increasing
number of race discrimination charges)
115 See Morris et al., supra note 9, at 64 (highlighting discrepancy between number of
women in corporate employment and number of women in upper level management); see
also Louis Uchitelle, Gaining Ground on the Wage Front, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2004, at Cl
(highlighting share of women in executive, administrative, and managerial occupations is
more than 46% and is similar or greater in professional ranks).
116 See Morris et al., supra note 9, at 69 (explaining study on pay gap between male
and female employees that controlled factors such as women delaying promotions by
taking time off from work to raise families and women willingly choosing professions that
pay less or quitting high-powered jobs); see also Uchitelle, supra note 115, at C1 (noting
that working women now earn just over 80% of what men do).
117 See Anne Fisher, How You Can Do Better on Diversity, FORTUNE, Nov. 15, 2004, at
60 (noting only 32% of U.S. employees think their companies do a decent job of hiring and
promoting people other than white males); see also Antilla, supra note 10, at A19
(commenting that although Merrill Lynch settled class-action sex discrimination case in
1976 and pledged that 18% of their brokers would be women by 1980, it still only has
women in 15% of its stockbroker positions today).
118 See Jute v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., No. 04-3927-CV, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS
18038, at *3 (2d Cir. Aug. 23, 2005) (demonstrating example of how employee
discrimination becomes more complex when employers have ability to use "post-merger
reorganization" as reasoning behind termination); see also Tully, supra note 11, at 21
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companies announced forty-eight deals of $1 billion or more,
totaling an "astonishing' $357 billion. 119 Despite the bubbling
optimism connected with the merger frenzy, the truth is that
such mega-mergers "typically produce about twice as many losers
as winners."120 A major factor in determining what constitutes a
"loser" and a "winner" is whether the merger generates sufficient
synergy. 12 1
Adequate synergy is defined by raising earnings while
integrating both the acquiring and acquired corporations'
businesses cultures. 122 Because integration typically involves
major restructuring and many job cuts, companies whose
philosophies and cultures are similar benefit from this process. 123
In terms of promoting diversity through a merger, both sides
must have a commitment to encourage diverse leadership.124
However, in the overwhelming majority of deals, diversity is not
considered a major factor in deciding whether to merge.125 As a
result, studies have shown that women and minorities are much
(noting launch of new merger wave in corporate America that "marks not a tentative
comeback but what looks like the start of a swaggering, full-fledged frenzy");
119 See Tully, supra note 11, at 21.
120 See Tully, supra note 11, at 21.
121 See Vivian Marino, Shafts Of Light Seen In The Merger Tunnel, N.Y. TIMES, June
2, 2002, § 3, at 4 (highlighting that "about half the executives interviewed attributed
unsuccessful deals to their own poor evaluation of the potential synergies and benefits of
a merger"); see also Tully, supra note 11, at 21 (noting that buyer must generate sufficient
synergies by cutting jobs, combining computer systems, or selling more products to same
customers, in order to pay for premium over market value).
122 See Tully, supra note 11, at 21 (explaining that buyer must raise earnings quickly
enough to justify value market was already placing on the target before the deal was
announced in order to have a successful merger). See generally Paddy Manning, Mega
Mergers Stretch The Envelope, THE AUSTRALIAN, April 9, 1999, at 35 (positing that
"[m]ergers are all about synergies and efficiencies, as well as about market share").
123 See Tully, supra note 11, at 21.
124 See Cingular Recognized for Diversity, MEMPHIS Bus. J., Aug. 8, 2005, available at
http://memphisbizjournals.com/memphis/stories/2005/08/08/daily3.html?from-yf=l
(suggesting that Cingular's merger with AT&T Wireless was successful due to diversity
and inclusion initiatives); see also Elisabeth Frater, Unite and Conquer: Corporate
Mergers - Tackling the Tough Issues and Creating the Best of Both Diversity Worlds,
MINORITY CORPORATE COUNSEL ASSOC. (2004), http://www.mcca.com/site/data/magazine/
2004-09/uniteconquerO904.shtml (adding companies must not only make a commitment to
diverse leadership within corporate ranks, but also among key vendors, including law
firms, advertising partners, and consulting agencies).
125 See Frater, supra note 124 (positing that corporate mergers and acquisitions are
generally not driven by diversity concerns). See generally Stuart Silverstein, Breaking The
Glass; Panel Seeks To Remove Ceiling On Promotions, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1994, at D2
(citing the U.S. Labor Department's Glass Ceiling Commission as considering new ways of
promoting diversity, including requiring companies seeking antitrust clearance for
mergers to meet equal employment opportunity standards).
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more likely to lose their jobs or be demoted in a reorganization.126
In fact, downsizing, an element of every merger, has been defined
as "the greatest challenge to workplace diversity."127
C. Legal Theories Underlying Diversification
1. The Economic Justification: Diversity as 'Good For
Business'
The 'diversity is good for business' rationale gained acceptance
after the famous affirmative action case, Gratz v. Bollinger.128 In
Gratz, amicus briefs in support of the University of Michigan
Law School's affirmative action policy were signed and submitted
by a "veritable who's who of the country's largest and most
profitable corporations."129 The briefs defended affirmative action
in terms of the "demands of the marketplace".130 They asserted
that it was in the best interest of American businesses to develop
access to a substantial group of talented minorities who have
graduated from the nation's best educational institutions if
American companies wished to continue prospering and
expanding in a competitive global economy.131 Justice O'Connor
placed substantial weight on these amicus briefs and the
economic justification for diversity in her majority opinion. 132
126 See Faye Rice, How To Make Diversity Pay, FORTUNE, Aug. 8, 1994, at 79
(discussing that at many companies women and minorities are often placed in low-level,
dead-end staff positions which are typically cut first during reorganization); see also A
Report on the Glass Ceiling Initiative, U.S. Dep't of Labor, http://www.mith2.umd.edu
WomensStudies/GenderIssues/GlassCeilingLaborDeptInfo/glass-ceiling-initiative (last
visited January 17, 2006) (finding that "minorities and women are less likely to obtain
positions in line functions - such as sales and production- which most directly affect the
corporations' bottom line, and are considered the fast track to the executive suite").
127 Rice, supra note 126, at 79.
128 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
129 Wilkins, supra note 113, at 1552.
130 Wilkins, supra note 113, at 1553.
131 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331 (2003) (acknowledging that "major
American businesses have made clear that the skills needed in today's increasingly global
marketplace can only be developed through exposure to widely diverse people, cultures,
ideas and viewpoints"); see also Wilkins, supra note 113, at 1553 (determining that "[i]f
American business is to continue to expand and prosper in a competitive global economy,
the current captains of capitalism sternly warned, then these organizations must have
access to a substantial pool of talented minorities who have graduated from the nation's
best educational institutions").
132 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 335 (holding that "[iun order to cultivate a set of leaders
with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership be
visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity"); see also
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Today, it is well-documented that diversity is, in fact, 'good for
business.' Many corporations have signed onto this rationale and
have reaped financial benefits from instituting diversity
programs.133 For example, the merger between Anthem and
Wellpoint, two of the nation's largest health benefits companies,
brought together two corporations devoted to promoting women's
rights.134 Wellpoint lists as one of its major reasons for
diversification, the fact that "women are the decision makers
nearly 60% of the time when it comes to health insurance" and
"[flrom a business standpoint, our company has to reflect
that."135 In fact, corporations have become so accepting of
diversity as an economic factor that there is currently a market
for books and software dedicated to measuring "diversity return-
on-investment and performance."136
In what ways do corporations find that diversity enhances
their bottom line? First, the 65 Fortune 500 companies that
signed the amicus briefs argue that a diverse work force
facilitates effective problem-solving.137 The corporations claim
Wilkins, supra note 113, at 1553 (noting that these two corporate briefs were significantly
cited by Justice 0' Connor in Grutter).
133 See Rice, supra note 126, at 79 (suggesting that diverse work forces can enhance
performance and are vital to workplace success); see also Wilkins, supra note 113, at 1554
(commenting that frustrated diversity advocates in large law firms "have increasingly
turned to the kind of 'diversity is good for business' arguments articulated in Grutter to
put pressure on firm managers to hire and promote minority lawyers").
134 See Dana Knight, Anthem-WellPoint Deal Bodes Well For Female Managers,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Jan. 28, 2005, at 1C (positing that WellPoint is good at advancing
women in business); see also WellPoint Named Top Company for Women Execs,
Earnings.com, http://fulldisclosure.com/releasetext.asp?ticker=ath&coid=82476&client=c
b&release=66223 (last visited January 17, 2006) (noting that WellPoint was named one of
America's Top 25 Companies for executive women).
135 See id.
136 See J. Cunyon Gordon, The Legal Profession, Looking Backward: Painting by
Numbers: "And, Um, Let's Have a Black Lawyer Sit At Our Table," 71 FORDHAM L. REV.
1257, 1278 (2003) (noting mockingly that companies can "buy books like Measuring
Diversity Results for $34.95 and if purchased with the 'Diversity Start-up Metrics
Software' the skittish CEO rates a package price of $149.00 (a savings of over $10!)"). See
generally Dallas, supra note 4, at 797 (explaining study of board best practices which
found consensus among working groups that there are substantial economic arguments in
favor of diversity).
137 See Wilkins, supra note 113, at 1586 (noting that 65 Fortune 500 corporations
stated in their brief that "a diverse group of individuals educated in a cross-cultural
environment has the ability to facilitate unique and creative approaches to problem-
solving arising from the integration of different perspectives"); see also Brief of Amicus BP
America Incorporated as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 2, Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02-241, 02-516) (noting that, "[b]ecause BP strongly
believes that innovation, one of its core values, can only come from encouraging true
diversity of styles and ideas while leveraging multiple talents, BP has made diversity and
inclusion a strategic focus of its business in the [United States] and around the world");
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that heterogeneous groups of employees with different
perspectives arrive at more innovative ideas.138
In addition, proponents of the 'good for business' rationale note
that the world is multi-cultural and that ethnic groups have
buying power; thus, it is necessary for businesses to have
employers who can "talk" to these ethnic consumers and give the
business credibility.139 The theory is that the more diverse a
company's employees are, the more adept those employees will be
at understanding the wants and needs of diverse consumers. 140
Further, studies have measured share price reaction to the
announcement of diversity awards and to publicized settlements
of discrimination lawsuits.141 For example, firms who have
received the Exemplary Voluntary Efforts Award given by the
Department of Labor to businesses that promote diversity have
shown significantly positive excess returns while firms found
liable for discrimination have exhibited significantly negative
excess returns.142 Lastly, proponents of the 'diversity is good for
Brief of General Motors as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 24, Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02-241, 02-516) (positing that "[a]bundant evidence
suggests that heterogeneous work teams create better and more innovative products and
ideas than homogenous teams").
138 See Roger Eglin, Diversity Helps To Oil Progress at BP, LONDON TIMES, Oct. 24,
2004, at 6 (explaining survey results by consulting company which found that among
other things inclusive environments can foster innovation); see also Lynne A. Dallas, Does
Corporate Law Protect The Interests Of Shareholders And Other Stakeholders?, 76 TUL. L.
REV. 1363, 1391 (2002) (noting that group studies into background characteristics of
management teams have found heterogeneous groups tend to make higher quality
decisions in matters involving creative and judgmental decision making).
139 See Gordon, supra note 136, at 1277 (explaining the access-and-legitimacy
paradigm that diversity is good business because of need for employees who can
effectively communicate with ethnic consumers); see also Steven A. Ramirez, Diversity
and the Boardroom, 6 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 85, 91 (2000) (stating that as country
becomes more diverse it will necessarily lead to more diverse marketplace of consumers).
140 See Gordon, supra note 136, at 1284-85 (stating that demand-side diversity calls
for matching communicator's race or ethnicity with that of consumer); see also Dallas,
supra note 138, at 1402 (suggesting that having heterogeneous groups who actually
include diverse perspectives and sets of values that the group is trying to assess can
improve the group's decision making).
141 See Dallas, supra note 138, at 1384 (explaining that diversity proposals have been
made by shareholders and have received substantial shareholder support); Steven A.
Ramirez, A Flaw in the Sarbanes-Oxley Reform: Can Diversity in the Boardroom Quell
Corporate Corruption?, 77 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 837, 847 (2003) (noting that institutional
shareholders have long sought to encourage more diverse corporate boards).
142 See Fields & Keys, supra note 3, at 7 (highlighting positive excess return of
sample of 34 firms at announcement of receiving Exemplary Voluntary Efforts Award for
promoting diversity versus the significant negative excess return of firms found liable for
discrimination); see also Roy S. Johnson, The 50 Best Companies for Asians, Blacks &
Hispanics, FORTUNE, August 3, 1998, at 94 (finding that companies included on list for
commitment to diversity continue to profit).
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business' rationale also cite that cultural diversity results in
organizational effectiveness.14 3
2. The Social Justice Rationale
In Justice Harlan's landmark dissent from the majority's
holding (now, of course, overruled) in Plessy v. Ferguson, 144 which
authorized separate but equal transportation, he emphasized
that classifications in the law based on race are unconstitutional
because "[o]ur Constitution is color-blind."145 Notably, diversity
was not justified on economic grounds here. Justice Harlan
opposed racial discrimination in the law because he considered it
morally wrong and socially unjust.146 This justification for
diversity in business is known as the social justice rationale.147
According to this rationale, diversity is important because
women and minorities deserve to be treated fairly and equally to
their white male counterparts in corporate employment.148
Moreover, this rationale suggests that when women and
minorities who have a more personal understanding of
discrimination are integrated into the corporate work force,
143 See Deborah Ramirez and Jana Rumminger, Civil Right in the New Decade: Race,
Culture, and the New Diversity in the New Millennium, 31 CUMB. L. REV. 481, 520
(2001/02) (noting that "[d]iversity is critical to managing a well-functioning workforce, to
devising creative problems solving and solutions, to eliminating racial hostility,
maximizing employee potential and to achieving institutional missions of business"); see
also Ramirez, supra note 141, at 94 (explaining that when companies recognize the
importance of fostering an environment of tolerance and sensitivity it can be a powerful
way to increase organizational effectiveness).
144 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494
(1954).
145 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (explaining
why the policy of "separate but equal" treatment of minorities should be abolished).
146 See id. at 559 (stating all citizens are equal in eyes of law, regardless of race); see
also William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 431 (1986)
(discussing Justice Harlan's view that all citizens of United States are entitled to
universal civil freedom).
147 See Wilkins, supra note 113, at 1599-1600 (explaining that social justice rationale
for diversity is based on idea that inclusion of racial and ethnic minorities in legal
profession preserves integrity and fairness of our legal system); see also Carl G. Cooper,
Diversity: Denied, Deferred or Preferred, 107 W. VA. L. REV. 685, 688-90 (2005) (outlining
moral case for diversity).
148 See Wilkins, supra note 113, at 1600 (explaining success of black lawyers in
corporate law firms is a matter of social justice because it is "an integral part of ensuring
that blacks have access to every aspect of American economic, social, and political life");
see also Robert Brookins, Mixed-Motives, Title VII, and Removing Sexism from
Employment: The Reality and the Rhetoric, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1, 39-40 (1995) (theorizing
gender discrimination has impeded women's professional development and thus deprived
society of benefits of women's creativity and insight).
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especially at the top levels of corporate employment, the
promotion of social responsibility is more likely. 149
Studies show that employees generally seek to experience
three things in their work: equity, achievement, and a sense of
camaraderie.150 Of these three components, equity, the feeling of
being treated justly, is most critical.151 Not only do employees
who are justly treated perform better for the business, they also
benefit individually through psychological and emotional
satisfaction.152
Anecdotal evidence supports the idea that diverse directors,
executives, and employers are more likely to promote corporate
diversity and social justice. 153 For example, Laura Liswood, a
senior adviser and former managing partner at Goldmann Sachs
and head of the Council of Women World Leaders at Harvard's
Kennedy School, states that the groups that dominate in
corporate America (usually white men) "tend to think the system
is meritocractic, and that it works correctly, and that if changes
are needed, they're minor,"154 while, in the exact same
organization, women and minorities believe the opposite.155 On
the other hand, some of the most successful African Americans in
149 See Wilkins, supra note 113, at 1599 (stating diversity in legal profession creates
inclusive legal system that better represents and protects rights of all ethnic and racial
groups in population); see also Steven Ramirez, supra note 14, at 119 (explaining women
and minorities are much more attuned to diversity issues and can make productive
changes in senior management).
150 See Eglin, supra note 138, at 6 (citing Sirota Consulting Survey that determined
these needs); see also Quentin Reade, Diversity, PERSONNEL TODAY, April 20, 2004, at 4
(listing these three needs that all employees seek).
151 See Eglin, supra note 138, at 6 (stating equity is most important of three needs);
see also Reade, supra note 150, at 6 (explaining if employees are not treated equitably,
enthusiasm drops drastically).
152 See Robert H. Cohen, Note, Pay Equity: A Child of the 80s Grows Up, 63 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1461, 1490 (1995) (explaining major component of employee satisfaction is how
fairly employees believe they are being treated in comparison with other employees); see
also John Hasnas, Ethics and the Problem of White Collar Crime, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 579,
636 (2005) (citing research demonstrating that employers who are committed to goals of
equity have more satisfied and dedicated employees).
153 See Ramirez, supra note 14, at 109 (explaining how diversity in management
leads to improved recruitment, retention and superior group interaction); see also Cheryl
L. Wade, Racial Discrimination and the Relationship Between the Directorial Duty of Care
and Corporate Disclosure, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 389, 427 (2002) (theorizing that minority
executives will improve workplace for minority workers and decrease societal racism
through heightened awareness).
154 See Morris et al., supra note 9, at 70 (suggesting a blindness to diversity issues
among those with corporate control).
155 See Morris et al., supra note 9, at 70 (explaining Liswood's theory on women and
minorities); see also Wilkins, supra note 113, at 1595 (suggesting minority lawyers often
feel trapped in certain practice areas where their race is perceived as valuable credential).
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corporate America have also been among the most socially
conscious and have benefited, not only their companies' bottom
line, but society through diversification.156 For instance, Franklin
Raines, the first black CEO of a Fortune 500 company, used his
status at Fannie Mae to open up new home ownership
possibilities for blacks and for working-class people of all
races. 157 Likewise, Kenneth Frazier, general counsel of Merck &
Co., Inc., assisted in opening a private school for underprivileged
children and was integrally involved in the pharmaceutical
industry's decision to make HIV/AIDS drugs available in South
Africa.158
IV. SPAWNING DIVERSITY INITIATIVES THROUGH MERGERS
Mergers are complex transactions that do not come
accompanied with a blueprint for success. 159 Generally, elements
of a successful merger include setting realistic goals about the
companies' shared role in the marketplace (i.e., whether their
products are compatible) and bringing the individual client bases
together as "greater than the sum of their parts."160 However, the
most challenging (and most over-looked) merger-related issues
are often internal. The "people" issues, specifically the combining
of company cultures, workforces, and philosophies, are what most
156 See Wilkins, supra note 113, at 1611-12 (citing examples of successful, socially
conscious African Americans); see also Mortgage Group Joins NAACP to Help Blacks
Purchase Homes, CHI. TRIB., January 22, 1999, at 6 (hereinafter Mortgage Group)
(discussing how successful African American chairman of Fannie Mae instituted program
to help minority homeowners).
157 See Wilkins, supra note 113, at 1612 (describing social consciousness of certain
successful African Americans); see also Mortgage Group, supra note 156, at 1 (describing a
partnership between Fannie Mae and the NAACP spearheaded by Raines).
158 See Wilkins, supra note 113, at 1612 (discussing Frazier's altruism); see also Vivia
Chen, Master of the Game, MINORITY L.J., Summer 2001, at 17, 20 (describing Frazier's
pro bono work and efforts in South Africa).
159 See CAREY & OGDEN, supra note 17, at 150 (stating "[w]e advise companies
involved in mergers or acquisitions to carefully assess talent on both sides before deciding
on whom to place where on the new team"); see also Eleanor Fox, The 1982 Merger
Guidelines: When Economists are Kings?, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 281, 297 (1983) (noting "[t]he
attempt is not to find economic truth, which we cannot do, but to develop a consensus,
which we must try to do").
160 See Frater, supra note 124 (describing the importance of company unison in
pursuit of a common goal); see also ANTHONY F. BUONO AND JAMES L. BOWDITCH, THE
HuMAN SIDE OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: MANAGING COLLISIONS BETWEEN PEOPLE,
CULTURES, AND ORGANIZATIONS 21 (Beard Books 2003) (explaining that "[a]s a way of
assuring merger and acquisition compatibility, most analysts have stressed the strategic
fit between the merger partners (or the acquirer and its target) and the importance of
ensuring overall strategic synergy.").
2006] DIVERSITY THROUGHMERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 473
times, make or break the merger. 161 Companies entering into
mergers benefit when their philosophies and cultures are
similar. 162
Mergers create intense periods where teams from the two
involved companies work together very closely to consider the
best practices, create new policies, and restructure the
workforce.163 Thus, mergers present ideal opportunities for
companies to start fresh with diversity initiatives. 164 A merger
talk can be "an outstanding time to create, revamp, or refocus
strategies for diversifying both corporate leadership and
employees." 165 On the other hand, diversity can be wholly
neglected if mergers are not handled properly and progress from
a diversity perspective can be placed at risk.166
A. Commitment to Diversity Plus Commitment to Diversity
Equals Social and Economic Success
Reviewing the many failed and few successful mergers of the
past few years shows that companies dedicated to diversity for
both social and business reasons tend to leverage diversity while
161 See CAREY & OGDEN, supra note 17, at 150 (discussing importance of having
adequate personnel before effectuating merger); see also Frater, supra note 124 (stating
that "[i]n the midst of this period of internal activity, it is critical to keep sight of people
issues, including diversity, to develop a shared vision, and to convey that shared vision
and commitment from the outset").
162 See CAREY & OGDEN, supra note 17, at 150 (noting "[iut is important... to have
directors whose personal backgrounds, and personal career development, have been in the
key functions for this business."); see also Frater, supra note 124 (discussing the benefits
of having the teams from two companies involved and working close together).
163 Managers and directors engage in delicate discussions about factors like business
synergies, potential cost efficiencies, management compatibility, and possible
management lineups, in addition to share price and stockholder reaction in the short and
medium terms. The legal teams then become very active in assisting in negotiations,
drafting the necessary agreements, and performing due diligence to ensure that prior to
finalizing the deal. Each company understands the material risk of the other business as
well as assuring that the merger will pass regulatory scrutiny with the SEC, the Federal
Reserve Bank, or whatever agency has jurisdiction. See Frater, supra note 124. Such
synergy and compatibility between two merging companies is vital for the success of the
merger. See generally CAREY & OGDEN, supra note 17, at 47.
164 See Frater, supra note 124 (discussing corporate restructure benefits that follow
from merger or acquisition); see also CAREY & OGDEN, supra note 17, at 47 (supporting the
idea of diversity as an important merger factor, stating "[i]f you've got two organizations
with different cultures, you've got a big problem").
165 See Frater, supra note 124 (quoting Joan Guggenheimer, executive vice president
and general counsel of Bank One Corporation before merger with JP MorganChase).
166 See Frater, supra note 124 (noting "[t]he goal remains to have people with diverse
views engaged and able to contribute toward the company's success"); see also Buono,
supra note 163, at 61 (stating "[tihe underlying strategic purpose of a merger or
acquisition can significantly influence how the firms will be combined").
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merging, experience smooth merger negotiations regarding the
cultural and philosophical aspects of the new firm, and
resultantly, reap social as well as economic benefits. 167 By
placing a strong emphasis on diversity during a merger, directors
and managers send a message from the top throughout the
organization that a commitment to diversity and cooperation is
required from everybody. 168 The merger between JPMorgan
Chase and Bank One represents an example of such a merger.169
When JPMorgan Chase and Bank One united in July 2004,
they consciously used their merger to further their mutual
commitment to diversity.170 Both companies even go so far as to
167 See Frater, supra note 124 (quoting Joan Guggenheimer on her experience with
McDavid, who was also committed to diversity throughout the process, stating "Bill and I
have been through many mergers before this, but in my experience this one has been
extremely smooth from a people and culture standpoint"); see also CAREY & OGDEN, supra
note 17, at 29 (emphasizing that "[c]ompanies that have achieved success in meshing
cultures make it look like a systematic, easy process").
168 See Frater, supra note 124 (discussing how company CEOs set the tone for
cooperation); see also CAREY & OGDEN, supra note 17, at 49 (explaining the importance of
having "extremely resourceful and creative leadership by the CEO of the combined
organizations").
169 See Frater, supra note 124 (stating the rationale for this particular merger was
diversification). See generally Press Release, Bank One, JPMorgan Chase, Bank One
Commit To Investing $800 Billion In Communities (April 15, 2004), http://investor.
shareholder.com/jpmorganchase/press/releaseDetail.cfm?releaseid=132883 (noting both
companies believe in strong corporate citizenship).
170 A company with a history of valuing diversity in mergers is most likely to
emphasize diversity in future mergers. See Frater, supra note 124. Thus, it is in the best
interest of directors embarking on a merger who are committed to diversity to review its
merging partner's past deals to infer compatibility on this issue. See id. JPMorgan Chase
is an example of a company with such a history. See id. at 2. The company presently
known as JPMorgan Chase & Co. was formed in December 2000 through a merger of
JPMorgan and Chase Manhattan Corporation. See JPMorgan Chase & Co.: 2001 Catalyst
Award Winner, CATALYSTWOMEN.ORG, http://www.catalystwomen.org/award/files/
winners/jpmorgan20chase.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2005). From the get-go both
JPMorgan and Chase Manhattan were dedicated to forging a company devoted to
diversification and approached their merger "as an opportunity to create a more inclusive
environment in which diversity was the key integration strategy." See id. The company is
quoted as stating, "diversity was the cornerstone of the company's success." Id. Prior to its
merger with JPMorgan, 20% of Chase's corporate officers were women and 3 of its 17-
member board of directors were women. Now the representation has increased across all
levels. See id.
Chase approached the merger with the "merger of equals" philosophy. See id. The
JPMorgan Chase merger is especially notable for the procedures it undertook to ensure
that both company's' cultures would be integrated successfully. See id. Chase utilized its
Central Merger Office (created during its 1996 merger with Chemical), which was
responsible for coordinating hundreds of merger related task teams. See id. The task
teams offered employees from both companies the opportunity to participate in the
merger process. See id. To ensure a clear and open process in people selection,
competency-based criteria were selected and communicated to all managers and
employees. See id. Chase also created a corporate diversity council made up of members of
Chase' senior management team which establishes the diversity agenda for the company.
See id.
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state that a "large part of the rationale for [their] particular
merger... was diversification." 171
After realizing that they were compatible business-wise during
early merger talks, both teams realized they shared a common
focus on "people issues" and, most importantly, diversity.172
Throughout the merger process, both companies took advantage
of the time they spent working together.173 JPMorgan Chase
leveraged its prior practice of leadership training in order to
ensure that the culture of the new firm was aligned with its
mission to "value and promote diversity"174 and both firms
strengthened their already deeply-rooted supplier diversity
practices.175
JPMorgan Chase and Bank One emphasize that
communication of their shared vision with employees was
integral to their merger's success. 176 They put the diversity
initiatives on the agenda of their first global staff meeting,
enlisted support of attorneys in furthering supplier diversity
goals, urged the entire staff to become active on their merged
Diversity Council, and communicated the importance they placed
on diversity to outside law firms.177 While JPMorgan Chase and
171 See Frater, supra note 124 (emphasizing the companies strong commitment to
diversity).
172 See Frater, supra note 124(admitting both companies had previously had diversity
on their respective agendas). See generally Press Release, J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. and
Bank One Corporation to Merge (Jan, 14, 2004), http://www.jpmorganchase.comncmcs?
pagename=Chase/Href&urlname=jpmcdaboutpress/2004-01-14merger (hereinafter
JPMorgan Chase Merger) (stating the merger makes tremendous sense operationally).
173 See Frater, supra note 124 (stating working together gives companies an
opportunity to get to know each other). See generally JPMorgan Chase Merger, supra note
172, at 2 (emphasizing looking forward to working with each other to bring unique
benefits to the constituents).
174 See Frater, supra note 124 (articulating several operating principals in order to
ensure the companies were culturally aligned). See generally JPMorgan Chase Merger,
supra note 174, at 2 (noting both companies' strong commitment to community
development and philanthropy).
175 See Frater, supra note 124 (expanding diversity programs to vendors such as law
firms). See generally April W. Klimley, To Compete During Economic Uncertainty,
Minority Suppliers Must Network, Form Alliances and Conquer the Internet, BLACK
ENTERPRISE, June 2001, at 291 (noting that JPMorgan Chase has sought to increase
supplier diversity at all levels).
176 See Frater, supra note 124 (suggesting a notice sent to employees about the
company's commitment to diversity was the first communication of the merger). See
generally JPMorgan Chase Merger, supra note 174, at 2 (noting the intense focus on
management).
177 See Frater, supra note 124 (noting importance of diversity to outside law firms).
See generally Press Release, Bank One, Bank One Names Joan Guggenheimer Chief
Legal Officer (April 9, 2003), http://investor.shareholder.com/jpmorganchase/press/
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Bank One both admit to initially instituting diversity programs
to address employee needs expressed in polls and surveys, they
now realize that their commitment to diversity has turned out to
be beneficial for general good management. 178
Making diversity a key issue in a merger is more difficult when
the companies have philosophical and managerial differences.179
For instance, when Time-Warner merged with AOL, both
companies had diversity as a goal from the outset; yet,
management needed to adapt to the concept.s0 Each of Time
Warner's many divisions had different traditions toward
diversity and all lacked sustained focus.iS1 However, the
companies used the restructuring that flowed from the merger as
an opportunity to implement diversity initiatives and involve all
participants, management, employees and outside vendors in the
process. 182
The new firm garnered ideas and developed practices from a
group of senior corporate managers, outside executives, and
diversity consultants.iS3  It created a diversity council to
releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=106029 (commenting Guggenheimer was head of Diversity for
Smith Barney).
178 See Frater, supra note 124 (suggesting promotion of diversity actually makes for
better management). See generally JPMorgan Chase Merger, supra note 174, at 2 (stating
firms' will select the best practices from each institution and implement them).
179 See Frater, supra note 124 (noting "it was very clear from the outset that diversity
would not get lost in the shuffle as a priority in the new company"). See generally Press
Release, Tom Baxter, President of Time Warner Cable; Steve White, SVP of AT&T
Broadband (Atlanta Region); and Art Torres, President of the Walter Kaith Foundation
Testify During the FCC's En Bank Hearing on Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO)
Rules (June 24, 2002), http://www.ncta.com/press/press.cfm?PRid=277&showArticles=ok
(hereinafter FCC En Banc Hearing) (commenting that the Diversity Counsel was set up to
share in experiences and learn how to diversify the employee base).
180 See Frater, supra note 124 (noting new executive vice president faced managerial
differences first day of work). See generally FCC En Banc Hearing, supra note 179, at 1
(noting diverse workforce is not just social goal).
181 See Frater, supra note 124 (discussing how Time Warner possessed a "strong
decentralized management structure, which came from a different tradition, making the
merger with American Online increasingly difficult). See generally Sallie Hofmeister,
Consensus-Building Skills Help Parsons Land Top Job, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2001, § 3, at 1
(noting how, after AOL-Time Warner merger, it became even more important to focus on
issues of diversity).
182 See Frater, supra note 124 (explaining how internally, companies like Time
Warner "benefit when their philosophies and cultures are similar" and that 'legal issues
associated with a merger are significant, and present a real challenge for corporate legal
teams"); see also Hofmeister, supra note 183, at 1 (noting Time Warner will become a
"model for diversity in corporate America").
183 See Frater, supra note 124 (stating how object of the plan was not only to "garner
new ideas from each division," but to implement a companywide policy "proven to work");
see also Mike Robuck, SCTE in Step with Diversity Week, CT PIPELINE, Sept. 20, 2005, at
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specifically formalize and advance diversity plans.18 4 Time
Warner mandated that executives interview diverse candidates
and undergo performance reviews.i8 5 In terms of the bottom-line,
Time Warner held each of its CEO's accountable for diversity in
their annual goals, tying a portion of their bonuses to that
success. 186 The newly merged firm now also requires supplier
diversity ensuring that a percentage of vendors are women and
minority-owned enterprises.i8 7
B. Ignoring Diversity in Mergers Compounds Problems for
Women and Minorities
When diversity is not valued by merging companies and is not
emphasized as an important issue during the merger process, the
end result can be disastrous for women and minorities. In 2002,
a federal district judge approved a $35 million settlement to be
paid by Rent-a-Center to resolve a class action sex discrimination
lawsuit. 88 The settlement covered over 5,300 women.i8 9 The
40 (noting that CEO of Time Warner, Glenn Britt, said that diversity "isn't a short term
initiative; it's a long-term process and we support that").
184 See Frater, supra note 124 (discussing that diversity council's goal was "to
formalize and advance diversity and an action plan with metrics that were unique to
[each] division"); see also Tom Baxter, Opening Comments, En Bank Hearing on
Broadcast and Cable Equal Employment Opportunity Rules (June 24, 2002),
http://www.fcc.gov/realaudioltr062402.txt (noting that diversity council was created so
that each division of the parent company could "share experiences and success stories in
terms of seeking greater diversity in our employee base, management, and third-party
business relationships").
185 See Frater, supra note 124 (highlighting Time Warner's mandatory requirements
that other companies did not have including, but not limited to, performance reviews); see
also Baxter, supra note 184 (discussing Time Warner's active recruitment at local colleges
and universities, to look for new talent and develop "people of color and women as part of
that group").
186 See Frater, supra note 124 (noting that Time Warner looked to "attack diversity
on a comprehensive strategy: supplier, work force, target markets, content, philanthropy,
and targeted investments"). See generally Baxter, supra note 184 (discussing how Time
Warner has tried to diversify their employee base by providing internships, community
outreach programs, and specialized training programs for minorities and women).
187 See Frater, supra note 124 (noting that "tracking dollars and compensating people
for keeping diversity goals on the front burner can only go so far" and that management
must understand and believe in the benefits of diversity in order to see a continued
improvement); see also Baxter, supra note 184 (discussing how Time Warner stresses
importance of diversity with regard to its suppliers and business partners and how
company has managed to contract with minority-owned contractors and suppliers over
10% of the time).
188 See Carrie Mason-Draffen, Sex Discrimination Settlements, NEWSDAY, Jul. 13,
2004, at A5. There have been a number of class action sex discrimination lawsuits over
last ten years against notable companies including Morgan Stanley, Pacific Bell/Nevada
Bell, and Mitsubishi Motors Corp. See Lynn Y. Bruner, Court Gives Final Approval to $47
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plaintiffs' major claim was that, in 1998, when Rent-a-Center
was acquired by Renter's Choice90, a notoriously sexist and
male-dominated organization, Rent-a-Center's female employees
were rapidly purged from the new firm, job requirements were
made more stringent to prevent women from being hired, and
remaining female employees were grossly mistreated. 191
Before the acquisition, Renter's Choice had a "systematic, top-
down corporate culture that drove away female employees."192 Its
CEO, Ernie Talley, had been overheard stating that "women
belonged in the kitchen, not in the rent-to-own business."193 This
attitude was reflected at every level of the company.194 To name
but a few of Rent-a-Center's discriminatory practices, women
were subjected to sexual and derisive comments, work
requirements were changed in an effort to induce female
Million Settlement in Sex Discrimination Suits Against Rent-A-Center By EEOC and
Private Plaintiffs, Oct. 4, 2002, http://www.eeoc.gov/press/lO-4-02.html.
189 See Geri L. Dreiling, Past Due: A Federal Judge Forces the Boys of Rent-A-Center
to Clean Up Their Bad Behavior, KANSAS CITY PITCH WEEKLY, May 9, 2002, at Cover
(describing how, as per settlement agreement, Rent-A-Center agreed to fill ten percent of
job vacancies during the first fifteen months following settlement with women who had
been fired and agreed to create a human resources department); see also Bruner, supra
note 188 (noting soon after Judge David Herndon approved initial settlement offer, 26,728
claim forms were sent to women who were currently employed by Rent-A-Center, or
worked there in past, and also to women who were known to have applied for work but
were rejected for hire).
190 See Dreiling, supra note 189 (stating acquisition of Rent-a-Center by Renter's
Choice created largest rent-to-own company in America); see also Bruner, supra note 188
(noting Rent-A-Center was given a December 2, 2002 deadline to transfer settlement
funds that would be disbursed to women who claimed they were fired or forced out of the
company after the company was acquired by Renter's Choice, four years prior).
191 See Dreiling, supra note 189, at 1 (noting women were forced to clean bathrooms,
forced to lift 75 pounds as a prerequisite to employment, and women's employment
applications were destroyed by management); see also Robert Grossman, Events at Rent-
A-Center Prove That When Employers Don't Respect HR Today, They'll Pay Tomorrow,
SOCIETY FOR HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT ONLINE (2002), http://www.shrm.org/hr
magazine/articles/0802/O802covstory.asp (describing company as being unprofessional in
a number of ways, such as the "good old boys" drinking and having go-go dancers perform
on stage for entertainment purposes).
192 See Dreiling, supra note 189 (stating attitude of discrimination proved costly for
Rent-A-Center as large class action discrimination suits were brought against them,
similar to other companies such as Mitsubishi, Shoney's, State Farm, and Home Depot);
see also Grossman, supra note 191 (describing how district managers would often go to
stores in their district operated by males and tell them how to improve their business, but
did not offer the same advice to female mangers).
193 See Dreiling, supra note 189 (describing details of Rent-a-Center class-action
settlement).
194 See Wilfong v. Rent-a-Center, No. 00-CV-0680-DRH, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22718, at *8, 17 (S.D.Ill. Dec. 27, 2001) (commenting on enforcement of company-wide
policy of intentional sexual discrimination that is spelled-out by company's top executives
and followed at every level of the company); see also Dreiling, supra note 189 (noting
such).
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employees to quit and to keep women from applying, women who
complained about boorish or offensive behavior were ignored or
punished, and pregnant employees were fired.195
On the other hand, the pre-acquisition Rent-a-Center was
considered a "good place to work" by female employees.196 In
their class action sex discrimination suit, female employees of
Rent-a-Center emphasized that the company's culture drastically
changed after it was purchased by Renter's Choice.197
Renter's Choice's management grabbed the reigns of the new
firm; they immediately increased the lifting requirement for store
employees from 50 pounds to 75 pounds so to disadvantage
potential female applicants and encourage female employees to
quit,198 male higher-ups sexually harassed the female employees,
managers were criticized for sending female candidates to take
management tests, pregnant women were fired on the spot, and
male coworkers engaged in "base, crude, and abusive"
behavior.199 Before the acquisition, Rent-a-Center's workforce
was 20.9 percent female, whereas only 1.8 percent of Renter's
Choice's employees were women.200 In only two years after Rent-
a-Center was acquired by Renter's Choice, the proportion of
195 See Wilfong, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22718, at *24 (discussing the various claims
by the plaintiffs of sexual harassment, pregnancy discrimination, demotion and unequal
working conditions); see also Dreiling, supra note 189 (describing some of the ways in
which atmosphere of Rent-a-Center spawned harassing environment).
196 See Dreiling, supra note 189 (describing conditions at Rent-a-Center before
acquisition).
197 See Wilfong, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22718, at *4 (noting that post-acquisition
Rent-a-Center discriminated against female employees at various stages of their
employment including hiring process); Dreiling, supra note 189 (referring to the
management of Renter's Choice as the "good ol' boys from Texas").
198 See Dreiling, supra note 189 (discussing how managers were ordered to send
female employees out to make deliveries and pickups alone so that they would inevitably
perform poorly according to new requirements); see also Robert Goodrich, Federal Judge
Approves Rent-a-Center's $47 Million Settlement of Sex Bias Suit, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, October 5, 2002, at 10 (noting that women were asked to lift furniture and
appliances weighing up to 75 pounds).
199 See Wilfong, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22718, at *10, n.4 (delineating several
offensive statements made by officers and directors of Rent-a-Center to female employees,
such as "[ylou were fired because you're a woman."); see also Dreiling, supra note 189
(citing an example of such behavior where male assistant manager grabbed female
assistant manager's buttocks).
200 See Wilfong v. Rent-a-Center, No. 00-CV-0680-DRH, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22718, at *11 (S.D.Lll. Dec. 27, 2001) (comparing almost 50% decrease in female
employment with the continual increase in male employment in years immediately
following acquisition); see also Dreiling, supra note 189 (referring to Talley's companies as
an "empire").
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women in the combined workforce had dropped to 8.5 percent. 2Ol
About half the women who had been working for Renter's Choice
were gone.2O2 The disparity between male and female employees
was similar at the company's top levels. All seven vice presidents
were men, all 45 regional directors were men, 265 men and 7
women held the position of market manager, and 30 men and
just 2 women were service managers. 203 In addition, the new firm
had an all-male board of directors. 204
While corporate culture clashes typically follow when
businesses merge, the female ex-Rent-a-Center employees who
filed the class action defined the attitude of the new regime as
"shocking."205 Just five months after the acquisition, employees
of the new company called it a "downright hostile place for
women." 206 Women who had devoted decades to Rent-a-Center
were forced to leave or were fired, regardless of job
performance. 207 Female employees were sexually harassed on a
daily basis, and because the new company, at the behest of
201 See Wilfong, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22718, at *11 (noting that within two years
after acquisition, number of female employees had decreased from 2,092 to 1,151); see also
Dreiling, supra note 189 (highlighting that many women were fired while others felt they
had to quit to escape offensive work environment).
202 See Wilfong, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22718, at *11 (citing Talley's directive to "get
rid of' women in any way possible as plausible explanation for the drop in female
employment); see also Dreiling, supra note 189 (stating that as female population was
drastically declining, "one regional manager urged his store managers in a memo to
continue to hire gents").
203 See Wilfong, 2001 US Dist. Lexis 22718, at *13 (emphasizing fact that women
were denied promotions at significantly higher rates than similarly situated male
employees); see also Dreiling, supra note 189 (quoting company newsletter, Rental Times,
the cover of which featured a group photo of Rent-a-Center's regional directors, all of
whom were men, and the headline of the article read 'Meet the 'Suits' Who Try to
Motivate Us").
204 See Gender Bias Dispute Settled, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.), March 8, 2002, at
5E (explaining that, as part of settlement, Rent-A-Center must create human resources
department and seek women for company's all-male board of directors); see also Dreiling,
supra note 189 (noting that Rent-a-Center was required to find women for its board of
directors).
205 See Dreiling, supra note 189 (describing offensive post-merger conditions);
Michael Selmi, Sex Discrimination in the Nineties, Seventies Style: Case Studies in the
Preservation of Male Workplace Norms, 9 EMPL. RTS. & EMPLOY. POLY J. 1, 40 (2005)
(characterizing discriminatory behavior at Rent-A-Center as "extreme").
206 See Dreiling, supra note 189 (noting employee feelings post-merger); see also
Selmi, supra note 205, at 40 (quoting Rent-A-Center regional director who stated, "women
should be home taking care of their husbands and children, chained to the stove, not
working in my store").
207 See Dreiling, supra note 189 (summarizing lead plaintiff Wilfong's story); Sex
Discrimination Victims' Counsel Achieve Changes In Company's Personnel Policies, LAW
REPORTER, Dec. 2002, http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-qa3898/is200212/ain9153
610 (detailing Wilfong's post-merger ordeal).
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Renter's Choice, axed Rent-a-Center's human resource
department, the women had virtually nowhere to voice their
complaints. 208 One Rent-a-Center tradition the new management
did keep was their annual convention for top managers, held in
Las Vegas, complete with entertainment including scantily clad
cheerleaders and outings to strip clubs.209
The plaintiffs in the class action sex discrimination suit
against Rent-a-Center highlight that the discrimination and
harassment they endured did not occur until after Rent-a-Center
was acquired by Renter's Choice. 210 The suit also alleged that
the discrimination "emanate[d] from top management."211
As part of the settlement agreement, the new Rent-a-Center, in
addition to paying out $47 million, was forced to institute human
resource and diversity programs. 212 It agreed to fill 10 percent of
job vacancies during the first fifteen months following the
settlement with women who had been fired, to create a human
resource department, and to file quarterly reports for the
following four years describing the company's steps to end
discrimination, detailing complaints and providing statistical
information. 213 Any discrimination complaints will now be
decided by a court-appointed special master.214 While it vowed at
208 The new firm dismantled the human resources department. See Wilfong v. Rent-
A-Center, Inc., No. 00-CV-0680-DRH, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22718, at *14, n.6 (S.D.Ill.
Dec. 27, 2001). It created a "manager of coworker relations" to handle employee
complaints, but the position was held by a male who consistently sided with the male
managers when female employees brought complaints. See Dreiling, supra note 189.
209 See Dreiling, supra note 189 (describing Rent-A-Center's annual convention); Geri
L. Dreiling, Nasty Boys: The Women Screwed by Rent-A-Center are Threatening to Take
the Company to the Cleaners. But Ernie Talley and the Rest of his Texas Bubbas are
Trying to Have the Last Laugh, RIVERFRONT TIMES (Mo.), Feb. 27, 2002 (comparing Rent-
A-Center's annual convention to fraternity parties).
210 See Dreiling, supra note 189 (noting harassment of female employees began after
Talley's purchase of Rent-A-Center); see also Wilfong, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22718, at
*11 (noting drops in employment of women after Talley's acquisition).
211 Dreiling, supra note 189 (describing details of suit); see Wilfong, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22718, at *9-10 (noting statements like "women don't belong in rent-to-own" and
"get rid of women any way you can" reflect company policy when made by top executive,
as they were at Rent-A-Center).
212 See Wilfong & EEOC v. Rent-a-Center, Inc., WAGE- WOMEN ARE GETTING EVEN,
http://www.wageproject.org/sexdiscDB/sexdiscDB.php?mode=full&id=310 (last visited
Oct. 11, 2005) (hereinafter Wilfong & EEOC) (summarizing terms of settlement); Dreiling,
supra note 189 (describing pending settlement which has now been finalized).
213 See Wilfong & EEOC, supra note 212 (detailing agreed to settlement); Dreiling,
supra note 189 (describing conditions of settlement).
214 See Dreiling, supra note 189 (noting settlement clause requiring discrimination
complaints to be decided "by a court-appointed special master"); Geri L. Dreiling, Hell
Hath No Fury: The Good Ol' Boys at Rent-A-Center Raise a White Flag-They're Licked,
482 ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 20:2
the time of the settlement to increase the number of women on
its board, as of 2005, only one out of Rent-a-Center's eight board
members is female. 2 15
C. Using Mergers to Change Face and Build Diversity
The union of BP and Amoco provides an example of a merger
which brought about positive reform in BP's commitment to
diversity. 216 Historically, BP, a worldwide petroleum empire, has
been known as a "long bastion of Anglo-Saxon males."217 Until
recently, BP had never employed a women or foreigner in a
senior position and diversity was an issue left relatively
undiscussed. 218 While BP's world-wide expansion 219 resulted in
male and female employees of almost every nationality joining
BP's work force, 220 the company did not develop a commitment to
diversification or inclusion of female and minority employees.
Diversity was merely forced upon it and "left to chance."221
DALLAS OBSERVER, Mar. 14, 2002, http:lwww.dallasobserver.comlIssues/2002-03-
14/news/news2_print.html (noting court-appointed special master clause).
215 See Corporate Governance, RENT-A-CENTER, http://www.corporate-ir.netireye/
irsite.zhtml?ticker--rcii&script=2260 (last visited Nov. 13, 2005) (listing Mary Elizabeth
Burton as Rent-A-Center's only female board member); see also Executive Bios, RENT-A-
CENTER, http://www6.rentacenter.com/site/page/pg4301.html (last visited January 17,
2006) (listing five male and zero female Rent-A-Center executives).
216 See Eglin, supra note 138, at 6 (noting that BP took more proactive approach to
diversity following merger with Amoco); see also Diversity, BP GLOBAL, http://www.bp.com
/sectiongenericarticle.do?categoryId=9002292&contentld=3072071 (last visited January
17, 2006) (noting that seventy percent of BP's employees find their work environment one
where people from different backgrounds can succeed and seventy-six percent feel
protected against harassment).
217 Eglin, supra note 138, at 6 (describing history of BP).
218 See Eglin, supra note 138, at 6 (asserting that, in the past, any mention of
concepts of diversity or inclusion to white, male Anglo-Saxon management would lead
invariably to looks of incomprehension); cf. Long Road Into Top Posts for Women, ENERGY
DAY, Apr. 25, 2002, at 5 (hereinafter Long Road) (noting that BP is one of three major oil
companies that are members of Opportunity Now, a pan-industry organization which
campaigns to increase women's participation in workforce at all levels).
219 See Eglin, supra note 138, at 6 (discussing BP's current status as biggest single
energy investor in Russia and China); Alan F. White, Organizational Transformation at
BP: An Interview with Chairman and CEO Robert Horton; British Petroleum, HUM.
RESOURCE PLAN., Feb. 1992, at 3 (quoting former BP Chairman as saying that BP's
organizational goal is to be "Most Successful Oil Company in the World").
220 See Eglin, supra note 138, at 6 (positing that BP's 110,000 employee workforce
includes members from almost every nationality, culture, ethnic background, and
religion); Long Road, supra note 218, at 5 (reporting that BP increased the number of
female executives in its senior leadership group by 40% from 2000 to 2002).
221 Eglin, supra note 138, at 6 (noting historical lack of import placed on diversity by
BP).
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BP soon learned, however, that if the company was going to
have a productive workforce and be successful in the
marketplace, diversity and inclusion would have to be
managed.222 BP used its merger with Amoco, a company already
taking diversity seriously, to reevaluate its attitude and
commitment toward diversity.
The merger with Amoco led BP to the creation of a new
executive position at the company: Vice President of Diversity
and Inclusion.223 Notably, BP hired a woman to fill this job. BP
recognized that its approach of hiring a diverse group of people
and letting diversity matters sort themselves out was ineffective
and barriers to female and minority advancement remained.224
As a result, BP has initiated a new policy that not only
emphasizes diversity, but inclusion as well. Patti Berringer, BP's
Vice President of Diversity and Inclusion, lists many reasons for
BP's new commitment to diversity that include the economic,
social, and ethical justifications. 225 By creating a "depth of
understanding" and "willingness to come to terms with [the
diversity] issue" throughout its merger with Amoco, BP has been
222 See Eglin, supra note 138, at 6 (positing that, although BP had originally rested
on erroneous ideology that employing diverse group of people would naturally lead to
inclusive environment, it has now recognized need for managing its diversity and
inclusion affairs); Judith S. Lederman, In Business; Managing Company Morale, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 31, 2002, § 14WC, at 3 (reporting that BP commissioned workplace study
soon after its merger with Amoco, revealing that employees had fewer accidents on job
when there was better employee satisfaction, and forcing recognition that management
had to get closer to its employees).
223 See Eglin, supra note 138, at 6 (noting that, in many years of reporting on BP's
affairs, the author had never interviewed a woman because none was ever employed in
senior position); see also Ross Wigham, BP Puts Diversity on Global Agenda, PERSONNEL
TODAY, Aug. 6, 2002, at 7 (stating presence of women in BP's senior management team is
minimal, with only five females in four hundred).
224 See Eglin, supra note 138, at 6 (discussing BP's recognition that their
multinational employees would need to feel they were being treated with dignity and
respect, before diversity would appear on top rungs of corporate ladder); Sarah Murray,
Case Study: BP: Different Strokes for Different Folks, FIN. TIMES (London), May 10, 2004,
at 5 (quoting Patti Bellinger as saying that "[i]t isn't enough to put people together. It's
about creating mutual understanding, and one of the keys is to look for macro
interventions that create micro understanding").
225 Sirota Consulting was hired by BP soon after its merger with Amoco to conduct a
survey of employee attitudes. Sirota has suggested that BP will benefit from its new
dedication to diversity and inclusion because (1) heterogeneous teams of employees
produce optimum results, (2) diversity adds value to the organization in terms of diverse
ideas, viewpoints, talent and experiences; (3) diversity fosters innovation; and (4)
diversity and inclusion creates a safer work environment, encourages employee
engagement, increases commitment and pride, boosts customer satisfaction, and drives
financial performance. See Eglin, supra note 138, at 6; Lederman, supra note 222, at 3.
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able to change its face.226 While it is still a male-dominated
organization, more women and people of color are now being
recruited and promoted to senior jobs. 227
In consideration of its global employees and consumers, BP felt
a need to change its image. However, some corporations find
establishing a commitment to diversity a more urgent matter.
An example of this is R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., a printing
company challenged, over the years, by numerous age and race
discrimination suits.228 While most of the suits were, typically,
settled without admission of wrongdoing, the company's
reputation was severely tarnished.229 Donnelley used its merger
with Moore Wallace Inc., which created the largest printing
company in North America, to revitalize the company's diversity
initiatives. 230 Moore's CEO, Mark Angelson, who took over
Donnelley, strongly stressed diversity as a "fundamental precept"
to which he was "deeply committed."231 Since the merger it has
made an effort to recruit women and minorities for upper level
positions. 232 Currently, it has 2 women and 2 African-Americans
226 Eglin, supra note 138, at 6 (quoting Patti Bellinger, Vice President of Diversity
and Inclusion for BP).
227 See Eglin, supra note 138, at 6 (reporting that BP's Vice President of Diversity
and Inclusion, Patti Bellinger, was excited about depth of BP's understanding and
willingness to come to terms with its diversity issue); see also Top Women in Energy
Sector Honored for Trailblazing, Industry Achievements, BUS. WIRE, Apr. 30, 2004
(compiling a list of female executives in the energy industry, including several senior
officers at BP and Amoco).
228 See Barbara Rose, Donnelly's New Chief Emphasizes Diversity, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 6,
2003, at 1 (noting suits due to 1993 plant closings); see also Francine Knowles, What
Ruling Means to Workers, Employers, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 31, 2005, at 55 (identifying
race discrimination suits brought against R.R. Donnelly & Sons Co. in the 1990s as "high
profile").
229 See Rose, supra note 228, at 1 (mentioning how Donnelly "was plagued for years
by age-and race-discrimination suits), see also Ronald E. Yates, Donnelley Takes to a
Challenge Like Ink to Paper, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 22, 1996, at 1 (discussing $500 million class
action racial discrimination suit against R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co. which alleged
"intentional and outrageous race discrimination").
230 See Eric Herman, Donnelley Names Exec to Improve Minority Hiring, CHI. SUN-
TIMES, Mar. 9, 2004, at 55 (discussing creation of executive position at Donnelley aimed at
"improving minority hiring an outreach"); Rose, supra note 228, at 1 (reporting comments
by new CEO which pledged to emphasize diversity).
231 See Barbara Rose, Diversity Labeled Priority by New Chief at Donnelley, CHI.
TRIB., Mar. 9, 2004, at 1 (noting suits due to 1993 plant closings); see also Rose, supra
note 228, at 1 (commenting on new CEO's views that it is no longer good business to be
represented solely by middle-age white males at executive meetings).
232 See Rose, supra note 231, at 1 (reporting that new vice president of diversity,
Damayanti Vasudevan, will promote diversity with "strategies for the workplace and
marketplace"); Rose, supra note 228, at 1 (noting that in recent years Donnelley has made
efforts to recruit women and minorities to stop spots).
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on its 11 member board, while 7 of its 25 top executives are
women and 2 are African-American. 233
V. THE LACK OF DIRECTIONAL INCENTIVES TO PROMOTE
DIVERSITY WHEN MERGING
The serious consideration and intense decision-making
undertaken by boards preceding merger approval provides a
valuable opportunity for directors to develop diversity efforts and
implement effective diversification programs. 234 By emphasizing
diversity during mergers, directors can strategically prevent
future or potential employment discrimination lawsuits and
costly settlements, 235 bolster their company's bottom line through
more successful consumer relations and effective employee
production, and further the social and moral good of employment
equity. However, mergers are typically entered into by
companies hoping only to expand their markets and increase
their share value. 236 Thus, most of the merger negotiation is
spent toiling over financial considerations. Due to the
predominance of bottom-line issues during mergers, coupled with
corporate law that fails to obligate directors to seriously consider
diversity, diversity issues are typically pushed to the back-burner
or left completely undiscussed. 237
233 See Rose, supra note 228, at 1 (describing current ethnic conditions at Donnelley).
See generally R.R. Donnelley, Board of Directors, at http://www.rrd.com/wwwRRD/
Investors/CorporateGovernance/BoardofDirectors.asp (last visited January 17, 2006)
(naming all eleven directors on Donnelley's board).
234 See Frater, supra note 124 (explaining how mergers create excellent opportunity
for companies to create, revamp, or refocus strategies for diversity issues). See generally
Wade, supra note 8, at 223 (noting that several commentators regard the American
workplace as "locus for improved race relations").
235 See Wade, supra note 153 (explaining how Texaco's and Coca-Cola's multi-million
dollar racial discrimination settlements resulted in temporary losses for shareholders and
potential significant harm to overall share value); see also Michelle McCann, Note,
Shareholder Proposal Rule: Cracker Barrel in Light of Texaco, 39 B.C. L. REV. 965, 967
(1998) (noting that companies suffer pecuniary losses from actual settlements).
236 See Fanto, supra note 49, at 273 (noting mergers are often entered into on
presumption that "constituent companies can create more value together than separate");
see also Nicole Duke, Comment, Hospital Mergers Versus Consumers: An Antitrust
Analysis, 30 U. BALT. L. REV. 75, 110 (2000) (indicating that expanding market share is
one of top five reasons hospitals merge).
237 See Fanto, supra note 49, at 333. This was also the problem during the enactment
of Sarbanes-Oxley. While Sarbanes provoked serious discussion of corporate governance
and would have been an ideal time to establish more ethical practices in terms of
diversity, the major focus of the Act remained on financial disclosures. See Watson, supra
note 3, at 25-29.
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While this Note asserts that it is in the best interest of
corporations, women, minorities, and society in general for
directors to leverage diversity during mergers, it recognizes that
directors are not entirely to blame for their inattention to this
important issue. It is suggested that neither state corporate law
nor federal securities regulations provide adequate incentives for
directors to emphasize diversity in mergers.
A. Fundamental Flaws in Corporate Law That Prevent Adequate
Diversification
1. Directors Can Satisfy Their Duty to Monitor Without
Compliance Systems
As discusses above, corporate governance principles urge
boards of directors to monitor their companies' compliance with
law, including employment discrimination law. However, U.S.
companies continue to discriminate against women and
minorities. 238 It is asserted that this discrepancy results, in part,
because the director's fiduciary duty of care does not obligate
directors to prioritize diversity.
Currently, directors are not legally obligated to install
compliance systems to monitor executive and employee
adherence to employment discrimination law.239 It appears
directors are protected from personal liability so long as they can
prove that they underwent a process of reasonable investigation
and due deliberation before deciding whether to implement a
compliance system. 240 This means that directors seemingly can
238 See Wade, supra note 8, at 224 (elaborating on ineffectiveness of directorial duty
to monitor); see also Alan Cowell, Brewmaster Breaks One Tradition but Upholds Another,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2004, at A4 (highlighting that in response to continued
discrimination in Norway the government has told companies "if women do not constitute
at least 40 percent of corporate boards by July 2005, they will be required by law to hire
more women as executives").
239 See In Re Caremark Int'l. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 968 (Del. Ch. 1996)
(finding corporate officers currently have no duty to establish monitoring systems to
insure compliance with all applicable statutes and regulations). See generally Naomi Ono,
Boards Of Directors Under Fire: An Examination of Nonprofit Board Duties in the Health
Care Environment, 7 ANN. HEALTH L. 107, 124-126 (1998) (analyzing the Caremark case
and its effect on director liability with respect to corporate compliance systems).
240 See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (emphasizing
encouragement of protecting and promoting full and free exercise of managerial power
granted to the board of directors); see also Caremark, 698 A.2d at 968 (stating that where
director exercises good faith effort to be informed and to exercise appropriate judgment,
he or she should be deemed to satisfy the duty of attention).
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decide against implementing a compliance or diversity program
to ensure that their workplace is discrimination-free if they find,
after performing due diligence, that it would be more costly to the
corporation, and therefore more detrimental to shareholder profit
maximization, to install such a program than to suffer the
consequences of violations of the law.
2. Directors Are Under No Obligation To Consider Non-
Shareholder Interests
Additionally, the shareholder primacy paradigm to maximize
shareholder profits, a "fundamental tenet of U.S. state corporate
law," does not mandate that directors act in the best interests of
employees or of the community. 241 Under the current shareholder
primacy model, directors are only required to consider the
maximization of shareholder wealth during decision-making
processes.242 Thus, under current state corporate law, directors
can satisfy their duty of care without considering the moral or
social implications of sex or race discrimination.
3. Ineffectiveness of Shareholder Derivative Actions
Diversity efforts are currently viewed as providing economic
benefits. Moreover, recent employment discrimination
settlements have been extremely costly to companies. Thus,
theoretically, courts should allow shareholders to bring
derivative actions243 against directors who do not implement
compliance or diversity programs based on a breach their duty of
241 See Gabaldon, supra note 4, at 835-37 (describing the share-holder primacy model
as demonstration of the idea that the interests of shareholders are preferred over those of
others with interests in the firm); see also Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments
for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1189 (2002) (citing Adolphe A. Berle's
belief that all powers granted to any group within corporation are at all times exercisable
only for benefit of the shareholders).
242 See Gabaldon, supra note 4, at 835-37 (defining board of directors as brain of the
corporation, whose responsibilities only include the making or supervising of decisions
necessary for the management of its affairs); see also Stout, supra note 241, at 1189
(explaining Berle's argument for shareholder primacy and belief that corporation exists
only to make money for its shareholders).
243 Shareholder derivative suits provide equitable relief to shareholders who, without
such judicial intervention, would lack standing because they lack direct harm. Wade,
supra note 8, at 227; see, e.g., Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 547-48
(1949). In such suits, shareholders' injuries derive from harm to the corporation. Wade,
supra note 8, at 227; see, e.g., Eisenberg v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 451 F.2d 267, 269 (2d
Cir. 1971).
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care. However, courts have not ruled in favor of any plaintiffs
asserting such claims to date. 244
The general failure of shareholder derivative actions alleging
breach of duty of care can be attributed to the procedural
prerequisites of such suits embodied in state corporate codes. 245
First, shareholders must make a demand, in a letter to the board,
that directors take corrective action or, alternatively, initiate or
continue the litigation seeking to hold the corporation and
wrongdoers within the company liable for misconduct. 246
Shareholder derivative claims seeking compensation for
corporate losses resulting from board-approved settlements of
several sexual harassment suits have been dismissed in the past
because shareholder plaintiffs failed to make demand on the
board before initiating their action. 247 Second, corporate boards
are entitled to appoint a special litigation committee to
determine whether a derivative action would be in the
corporation's best interest. As such, the decision of whether or
244 See Wade, supra note 8, at 227 (noting that "[d]erivative actions are likely to be
unsuccessful when they allege duty of care breaches that cause corporate losses as a
result of noncompliance with the laws that prohibit discrimination"); see, e.g. White v.
Panic, 793 A.2d 356, 359 (Del. Ch. 2000) (noting that, in granting motion to dismiss,
plaintiffs had not stated a claim on which to grant relief).
245 Such corporate policies were created to limit the number of derivative suits. See
Wade, supra note 8, at 227. One such policy is the demand requirement. See, e.g., White,
793 A.2d at 364.
246 See White, 793 A.2d at 364 (explaining purpose for demand requirement is to
distinguish between strike suits motivated by hope of creating leverage through prospect
of expensive and time-consuming litigation and suits reflecting reasonable apprehension
of director malfeasance that board cannot objectively pursue on corporation's behalf); see
also Wade, supra note 8, at 227-28 (stating that demand requirement's purpose is to
avoid waste of judicial resources by encouraging resolution of matter at issue without
litigation).
247 It is important to note that when the demanding corrective action from the board,
or litigation, would be futile, the procedural prerequisite of demand is considered excused.
White, 793 A.2d at 364. Demand is considered futile when directors have conflicts of
interests regarding the litigation. Id. Many times plaintiffs will fail to make demand on
the board under a mistaken belief that demand is excused if it seems that the directors
cannot exercise independent discretion in deciding whether to initiate the lawsuit. Id. at
365.
This was the case in White, where the accused harasser was the CEO and Chairman of
the Board. Id. at 358. Although there was only one inside director (who happened to be a
subordinate of the CEO), each outside director on the board also owed his position to the
accused harasser. Moreover, all board members were male. Despite this alarming
scenario, the court ruled that demand was not excused for futility and dismissed the
plaintiffs claim for failure to make demand. Id. at 366. The holding of this case is
particularly shocking considering that the accused harasser was responsible for securing
all director positions and paying each director annual retainer of $30,000 plus a fee of
$1,000 per board meeting. Id.
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not to initiate a lawsuit against the board of directors is,
effectively, placed in the hands of actual board members. 248
4. Due Diligence Does Not Include Deliberation of Diversity
Issues
In the context of mergers, the directors duty of care becomes
even more elusive. While in Van Gorkom, directors were held
liable for making a grossly negligent decision, the court primarily
based its decision on the directors' lack of procedural due
deliberation in approving the merger and the directors' failure to
disclose the actual monetary value of the corporation's shares to
shareholders when they submitted the merger for shareholder
approval. 249 Thus, it seems unlikely that directors will be held
liable for a breach of their duty of care when approving a merger
if they perform due diligence (investigate and deliberate financial
matters) and make all necessary disclosure regarding the
corporation's market value to shareholders. It does not appear
that directors are under any special duty to inform shareholders
about the corporation's diversity efforts or lack thereof or
whether the company with which it is merging values
diversity. 250 It also does not seem that a failure on the director's
part to inform shareholders about whether they plan to
implement a compliance or diversity program once the
corporation is merged will amount to a breach of the duty of care.
So long as the shareholders have correct material financial
248 See VIII DEL. CODE. ANN. § 141(c) (2005) (stating that "[t]he board of directors
may, by resolution passed by a majority of the whole board, designate one or more
committees, each committee to consist of one or more of the directors of the corporation.");
see also Wade, supra note 8, at 228 (listing second requirement to shareholder derivative
litigation allows board to appoint committee to determine whether such litigation would
be in the corporation's best interests).
249 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 874 (Del. 1985) (concluding Board of
Directors did not reach informed business judgment); see Alexander Khutorsky, Note,
Coming in from the Cold: Reforming Shareholders' Appraisal Rights in Freeze-Out
Transactions, 1997 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 133, 153-54 (1997) (describing bases for holding
in Van Gorkom).
250 See, e.g., Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872 (emphasizing encouragement of protecting
and promoting the full and free exercise of managerial power granted to the board of
directors and the business judgment rule itself presumed the directors will act on
informed basis and in good faith); In Re Caremark Int'l. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959,
968 (Del. Ch. 1996) (stating that where director exercises a good faith effort to be
informed and to exercise appropriate judgment, he or she should be deemed to satisfy the
duty of attention).
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information, it seems directors satisfy their fiduciary duty of care
in recommending a merger. 251
B. When Corporate Employment Discrimination Practices are
Kept Secret, Change is Unlikely
Like shareholder derivative actions, employment
discrimination lawsuits are unlikely to put pressure on boards to
consider diversity in mergers because such cases are generally
extremely difficult to prove and, even when successful, are
unlikely to cause the public to pressure corporations into
changing their ways.2 52 The courts that decided to certify the
class-action lawsuits brought by plaintiffs against Boeing and
Morgan Stanley enumerated a standard: if data on pay or job
levels indicates a pattern that is "two deviations from the norm,"
then there is "legal inference" that discrimination is present and
a suit can proceed. 253 This standard is generally difficult to meet.
Furthermore, while the threat of race or sex discrimination has
become one of corporate America's worst nightmares, companies
faced with such lawsuits have a strong weapon on their side. In
most (multi-million dollar) settlements that resolve class-action
employment discrimination lawsuits, the defendant company not
only fails to admit to the discrimination but requires the
plaintiffs to agree to confidentiality pacts.254  These
251 See VIII DEL. CODE. ANN. § 141(e) (2005) (stating that member of board is fully
protected in relying in good faith on the accounts or reports made to corporation by any of
its officers); see also Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 874-75 (holding that directors only had
duty to inquire into suspicious and deficient financial material put forth by one of the
directors in regards to possible merger).
252 See Selmi, supra note 205, at 15 (discussing how recent securities lawsuits
"describe an industry that remains resistant to change and hostile to women'); see also
Antilla, supra note 10, at A19 (stating that "[i]ngrained cultural misconduct changes only
when customers, colleagues and the public get wind of the nasty facts and companies are
embarrassed").
253 Boeing's own studies showed that its salary practices "adversely impacted
women," and "demonstrated statistically significant differences (i.e., standard deviations
in excess of negative two) in pay between men and women." See Beck v. Boeing Co., No.
COO-301P, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27622, at *13 (W.D. Wash. April 9, 2004). '"The norm is
generally defined as what might be expected, say, given the number of women [or people
of color in the company's] workforce." See Morris et al., supra note 9, at 64. Morris also
notes that while in some cases such as Wal-Mart and Costco the discrimination is blatant,
most times calculating the standard deviation can be "devilishly complex." See id.
254 See Jennifer Gordon, We Make the Road by Walking: Immigrant Workers, the
Workplace Project, and the Struggle for Social Change, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407,
440 (1995) (determining that "[e]ven when employers settle a matter with a small group
of workers, they frequently require the workers to sign a binding confidentiality
agreement."); see also Antilla, supra note 10, at A19 (noting that Morgan Stanley's
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confidentiality pacts prohibit the plaintiffs from discussing the
corporate practices of discrimination which led to the lawsuit. 255
Because the companies are under no duty to disclose the
practices themselves, the public remains unaware of how and to
what extent the large public company was discriminating (and in
many cases, continues to discriminate) against its female and/or
minority employees. 256 While the sheer volume of discrimination
cases brought by employees and great expense attached to
discrimination settlements hint at the seriousness of the
employer's offenses, the lawsuits will lack long lasting impact on
society. Likewise, investors are likely to quickly forget about the
short-lived controversy unless the details of the specific acts of
discrimination are allowed to penetrate the public. 257
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PROMOTING DIVERSITY THROUGH
MERGERS
It is suggested that as corporate law now stands, boards of
directors lack the incentives necessary to consider diversity as a
major factor when deciding whether to merge with another
company. It is asserted that shareholder activism, corporate
governance reforms mandated by the federal government and the
SEC, and the restructuring of corporate boards to include more
women and minorities will facilitate the necessary analysis and
attention due to diversity issues in corporate employment.
settlement included confidentiality pacts where shared documents will remain
confidential to ensure that no one learns how women were treated at work).
255 See Antilla, supra note 10, at A19 (explaining that confidentiality pacts prohibit
women from disclosing discrimination statistics to anyone and that any copies of
documents involving settlement were to be destroyed or returned); see also Gordon, supra
note 254, at 440 (finding that confidentiality pacts "enable the employer to avoid
correcting the underlying problem" because other workers and public are prevented from
knowing about it).
256 See Antilla, supra note 10, at A19 (suggesting that "[tihere's a long history of
securities firms fighting the ensure that the public does not learn how women are treated
on the job."); see also Morris et al., supra note 9, at 64 (concluding that traditionally,
corporate America has kept secret "the way it rewards its workers, determines entry-level
salaries, makes promotion decisions, and divvies up merit raises").
257 While the practices are currently occurring with more frequency, the public is still
not becoming aware of them because they are kept secret and, without public pressure to
change, corporations probably will not act. See Antilla, supra note 10, at A19. Practically,
"[olne simple solution would be for the EEOC to make public the reams of employment
data that companies are required to file every year." See Morris et al., supra note 9, at 64.
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A. Internal and External Corporate Governance Reforms
It is suggested that the goals of the corporation and duties of
the board of directors must be expanded to encompass notions of
social responsibility in general and diversity in particular. 258
Directors' fiduciary duties should not only run to shareholders
but also to employees and the community or society.259
While this Note proposes a progressive approach to corporate
governance where directors should be obligated to consider the
interests of non-shareholder stakeholders, it is also emphasized
that shareholders are harmed as a result of employment
discrimination lawsuits stemming from inattention to workplace
diversity; stock value falls as a result of the negative publicity
and large settlements paid to affected workers. While directors
do not have an obligation to maximize employee wealth or social
justice under the shareholder primacy paradigm, they must act
in the shareholders' financial interest. Thus, while the following
recommendations serve to benefit non-shareholder
constituencies, it is asserted that they are also consistent with
the shareholder primacy model.
1. Mandate Monitoring of Discriminatory Practices
The director's duty to monitor does not presently encourage
director activism in eliminating workplace discrimination.
Currently, state corporate law defers to the directors' decision to
install or not install compliance programs so long as directors
reasonably investigate and duly deliberate before making the
258 See Wai Shun Wilson Leung, The Inadequacy of Shareholder Primacy: A Proposed
Corporate Regime That Recognizes Non-Shareholder Interests, 30 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 587, 591 (1997) (arguing that "[a corporation] is a series of relationships, or, more
precisely, an aggregation of explicit contracts and implicit agreements among
shareholders, managers and stakeholders."); see also Gabaldon, supra note 4, at 836
(specifying that this approach is typically affiliated with neoclassical economic and
progressive corporate analysis).
259 See Gabaldon, supra note 4, at 836 (positing that "[c]orporate progressives
generally attempt to devise methods of setting more places at the table-for expanding
the goals of the corporation and the duties of management (most notably the board of
directors) to encompass notions of responsibility to other constituents, including broad-
based society"); see also Marlene O'Connor, Restructuring the Corporation's Nexus of
Contracts: Recognizing a Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV.
1189, 1194 (1991) (analyzing stakeholder model of corporate social responsibility in which
directors' fiduciary duties are expanded to include not only obligations to maximize
shareholder wealth, but also actions that shield employees from disruptions such as
corporate changes).
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choice. 260 However, it is asserted that boards must not leave
diversity to chance. 261 It is suggested that the director's duty to
monitor should include an obligation to install an extensive
monitoring system to ensure that executives and employees
comply with employment discrimination law and promote
diversity initiatives. 262
2. Require Attention to Diversity Under Duty of Care
In the context of mergers and acquisitions, directors are
required to reasonably investigate and duly deliberate the pros
and cons of a merger before recommending it for shareholder
approval.263 Studies show that the most common reason for
recommending a merger cited by directors in disclosures
mandated by the SEC is "to compete with global markets" and
mostly all material disclosures involve financial
considerations. 264 It is asserted that the director's fiduciary duty
of care to not make a grossly negligent decision to enter into a
260 See Gabaldon, supra note 4, at 858 (proposing that deferring to directors to
oversee corporate matters "establishes a process that.., will produce the same result as
an integrity-seeking conscience, and it allocates to specific individuals responsibility for
seeing that the process is carried out"); see also Wade, supra note 8, at 225 (concluding
that "[w]orkplace discrimination is a corporate governance issue because shareholders
rely on boards to monitor managers in a way that encourages compliance with the laws
prohibiting discrimination. Corporate boards that inadequately monitor compliance with
anti-discrimination law reduce, rather than maximize, shareholder wealth").
261 See Eglin, supra note 138, at 6 (noting ineffectiveness of BP's initial plan to hire
diverse employees by instituting diversity/integration programs); see also Wade, supra
note 8, at 226 (determining that "[bloards cannot simply assume that their executives and
employees comply with the law").
262 See Eglin, supra note 138, at 6 (highlighting that "diversity and inclusion could
not be let to chance - they had to be managed"); see also Gabaldon, supra note 4, at 866
(finding that "an individually focused approach requiring compliance by rank-and-file
employees would be the most likely to assure that issues were identified as an initial
matter," and is appealing because penalties avoid punishing shareholders).
263 The purpose of a board of directors is to promote stockholder interests and retain
a form of corporation oversight that involves the board in such issues as mergers and
acquisitions. See Board of Directors, WIKIPEDIA.COM, Nov. 12, 2005, http://www.en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Board-of_directors. Some commentators recommend boards set up
conscience committees akin to auditing committees instituted after the corporate
accounting scandals of the early 2000's made up of a diverse group of directors. See
Gabaldon, supra note 4, at 866.
264 See Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its
Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 417, 425 (2003) (noting that
one of corporation's most textual disclosures mandated by the SEC requires reporting
company to discuss its liquidity, capital resources, results of operations, and any other
information the registrant believes is necessary to understand its financial conditions);
see also Sharon Hannes, Comparisons Among Firms: (When) Do They Justify Mandatory
Disclosure?, 29 IOWA J. CORP. L. 699, 702 (2004) (explaining that comparisons of financial
information lies at core of all securities analyses).
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merger should require the director to investigate and deliberate
diversity issues, including the other company's diversity
initiatives, its history of discrimination, and its dedication to
implementing a program to ensure compliance with
discrimination law.
In the takeover context, it is suggested that a board's decision
to implement takeover defense mechanisms, in response to a
bidder that presents a threat to its corporate culture and
diversity efforts, should satisfy Unocal duties, even if the
acquisition would produce short-term shareholder profit
maximization. It is also asserted that when the sale and break-
up of the corporation becomes inevitable, directors should be
entitled to consider non-shareholder stakeholder interests.
3. Disclosure of Diversity Findings in Disclosures Mandated
by Federal Securities Laws
Presently, federal securities laws require directors to disclose
material information regarding a merger recommendation.
However, studies show that the information disclosed by
directors in satisfaction of the securities regulations is generally
financial in nature and rarely involves human or cultural
issues.265 Determining whether information is material is largely
left to the discretion of directors. It is asserted that federal
corporate governance reforms are necessary in response to the
increase in employment discrimination lawsuits as such reforms
were necessary after the corporate accounting scandals. As
Sarbanes-Oxley requires heightened disclosure of financial
information and scrutiny of boards of directors, new federal
reforms that require disclosure of compliance with employment
discrimination laws and of board composition should be enacted.
In addition, information regarding corporate diversity efforts and
compliance with employment discrimination law should also be
deemed "material" by the SEC and required in pre-merger
265 See Paredes, supra note 264, at 425 (explaining that the starting point for
appreciating disclosure requirements is the Regulation S-K form requiring information
regarding registrant's business development and prospects, legal proceedings, properties,
financial performance, directors and officers, and securities); Cynthia A. Williams, The
Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L.
REV. 1197, 1200-01, n.2 (1999) (noting that federal securities law requires disclosure of
vast array of financial data and arguing that SEC has power to require social as well as
financial disclosure).
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disclosures. Further, federal regulations requiring the auditing
of female and minority representation on boards of directors and
in top levels of management should be implemented. Lastly, the
SEC should prohibit corporations from including confidentiality
pacts in settlement offers.
B. Shareholder Activism
Shareholder activism is one way in which boards of directors
may be forced to rethink their ambivalence toward diversity in
the merger context and in the workplace in general.
Shareholders can submit proposals that bring the board's
attention to monitoring problems and the possible negative
consequences of ignoring diversity issues in a merger.266
Federal securities law provides the guidelines for shareholder
activists. Rule 14a-8 267 requires corporate managers to include
any proposal that satisfies the procedural and substantive
prerequisites, enumerated by the SEC under the rule, in
shareholder proposals contained within the proxy materials sent
to shareholders. 268  Once these proposals are distributed,
shareholders have an opportunity to vote on the proposal. 269
266 In the racial discrimination context, activists have purchased corporate stock as a
way to gain access to corporate managers and influence their employment practices. The
Rainbow/PUSH Coalition created the Wall Street Project which has purchased shares in
U.S. corporations in order to influence the decisions of corporate managers and directors.
See Joseph Kahn, Jackson Challenges Capital of Capital, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1999, at 3.
There are many steps shareholders can take in order to change racial discrimination in
the workplace. They can educate other investors about the potential dangers of companies
who have racially discriminatory practices, they can expose the conduct thereby making it
financially material, and they can also bring derivative actions alleging duty of care
breaches when managers fail to investigate and monitor race discrimination allegations.
See Wade supra note 8, at 392, 400-01. After Texaco settled a large race discrimination
case, two shareholder proposals regarding diversity were submitted that received strong
support from other shareholders. See Rye Brook, Investors Focus on Diversity at Texaco
Annual Meeting; Company Faces 94 Discrimination Filings, WASHINGTON POST, May 14,
1997, at D9.
267 SEC Rule 14a-8, 17 CFR 240.14a-8 (2005).
268 Rule 14(a) governs management's solicitation of shareholder proxies and provides
a process by which shareholders may communicate with management and other
shareholders on issues relating to corporate governance and was promulgated by the SEC
pursuant to authority granted to it under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See SEC
Rule 14a-8, 17 CFR 240.14a-8 (2005). Rule 14a-8 provides an opportunity for a
shareholder who owns a small amount of shares to have his or her proposal placed
alongside the company's proxy materials to be voted on at an annual or special meeting of
shareholders. See SEC Div. of Corp. Fin., Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14, Shareholder
Proposals, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, July 13, 2001, http://www.sec.gov
interps/legalIcfslb14.htm.
269 See MATTHEW BENDER & CO., 1-3 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: LAW AND PRACTICE §
3.05 [4] [b] [ii] (explaining that Rule 14a-8 allows shareholders to submit one proposal for
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Such proposals can suggest changes in corporate policy related to
significant social issues, including discriminatory conduct in the
workplace. 270  Proposals regarding traditional corporate
governance issues are clearly appropriate.
It is suggested that shareholder activists submit proposals that
prompt boards to reexamine corporate diversity initiatives and
compliance with employment discrimination law during the
merger process and strongly emphasize diversity as a factor
affecting synergy. Such proposals should encourage boards to
focus on their duty of care to reasonably investigate and duly
deliberate before recommending a merger to shareholders and on
their duty of care to monitor corporate compliance with
discrimination law during the merger process.
C. Enhance the Director's Relational Role and Include Women
and Minorities on Boards
Traditionally, boards were elected by shareholders for the sole
purpose of monitoring corporate managers to protect shareholder
interests. Today, institutional investors are putting pressure on
directors to explain how their decisions benefit shareholders. 271
As a result, the board's relational role has become of primary
importance. 272 As opposed to manager monitoring, relational
a shareholder vote); SEC Div. of Corp. Fin., Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14A, Shareholder
Proposals, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, July 12, 2002, http://www.sec.gov/
interps/legal/cfslbl4a.htm (noting that Rule 14a-8 allows shareholders to have their
proposals voted on at special or annual meetings of shareholders).
270 Proposals that relate to the "ordinary business operations" of a company will be
excluded, however. The SEC determines whether a proposal relates to a significant social
issue or an ordinary business operation. See Amendments to Rules on Stockholders,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-40018, 67 S.E.C. Docket 373, *3-4, 1998 WL 254809 (May
21, 1998). Proposals that might have social implications can still be deemed "ordinary
business operations" of a company. For example T. Rowe Price Group, Inc. was able to
exclude a proposal that required the Company to not sponsor or contribute to non-profit
organizations which undermined the American war on terrorism as dealing with ordinary
business operations. See T. Rowe Price Group, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2002 WL
31890967, *1-2 (December 27, 2002).
271 See Dallas, supra note 4, at 795 (explaining that institutional investors are using
legal doctrine of shareholder primacy to pressure directors to specify how their decisions
serve interest of shareholders); Troy A. Paredes, Too Much Pay, Too Much Deference:
Behavioral Corporate Finance, CEOS, and Corporate Governance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
673, 732 (2005) (noting that institutional shareholders are putting more pressure on
boards and CEO's).
272 See Dallas, supra note 4, at 795 (noting the managerialism is the predominant
mode of governance of U.S. public corporations); Jill E. Fisch, Corporate Governance:
Taking Boards Seriously, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 265, 285 (1997) (stating that increased
business complexity demands companies involve directors in strategic planning and other
management decisions).
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monitoring is the process by which board members exchange
information and ideas with the corporation's stakeholders, its
shareholders, consumers, and the legal and financial
communities to stay abreast of current issues in the outside
environment and ensure the continued support of the
stakeholders. 273 While the shareholder primacy model of the
corporation is still predominant, the idea that directors, when
making decisions on behalf of the corporation, may consider the
interests of not only the corporation's shareholders but also its
stakeholders is becoming readily accepted. 274
The board's relational role is particularly crucial when a
corporation is contemplating a merger; yet, it is frequently not
taken seriously or considered only in the 11 th hour.275 However,
because boards are responsible for recommending mergers to
shareholders 276 and smooth integration is a key component in
273 See Dallas, supra note 4, at 782 (defining relational role of a company); see also
Timothy L. Fort, The Corporation as Mediating Institution: An Efficacious Synthesis of
Stakeholder Theory and Corporate Constituency Statutes, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 173,
174 (1997) (discussing stakeholder theory, which similar to relational monitoring involves
corporation's duties towards employees, suppliers, local communities and other
stakeholders).
274 There are competing approaches regarding the role the corporation plays in
society. One view, put forth by Adolph Berle and E. Merrick Dodd in the 1930's, suggests
that the corporation is "not only a profit-making entity, but also an institution with social
responsibilities." Dallas, supra note 4, at 796. This approach is supported by case law that
upholds the fiduciary duties of directors, not only to shareholders, but also to the
corporation, as an independent entity. Id. The recognition of fiduciary duties that run
from directors to the corporation itself reflects the idea that directors are trustees for the
corporation and for its many stakeholders, including the community and consumers. This
view has also been codified in several constituency statutes in over half of the states
which permit directors to take the interests of stakeholders into account in their decision
making. Id. at 797. Even in Delaware, a state without such a constituency statute, the
Delaware Supreme Court has stated that directors may consider the interests of
employees, consumers, and other stakeholders when making decisions as long as these
decisions have a rational relationship to furthering a shareholder interest. Id. at 796-97.
Even leading proponents of shareholder primacy model have acknowledged that in order
to maximize financial value corporate managers must not only satisfy but enlist the
support of all corporate stakeholders. See Margaret M. Blair, Director's Duties in a Post
Enron World: Why Language Matters, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 885, 894-95 (2003). There
is also the argument that corporate social responsibility has been a factor in moving
corporate governance theory in the direction of stakeholders. See Cynthia A. Williams and
John M. Conley, An Emerging Third Way? The Erosion of the Anglo-American
Shareholder Value Construct, 38 CORNELL INVL L.J. 493, 495 (2005).
275 See CAREY & OGDEN, supra note 17, at 142 (noting crucial decisions regarding
board structure are often not given sufficient thought or deliberation and are usually
made in period of pressure near end of merger negotiation).
276 See e.g., VIII DEL. CODE ANN. § 14 1(a) (2005) (stating business and affairs of every
corporation shall be managed by or under direction of board of directors); see also
MATTHEW BENDER & CO., 1-4 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: LAW AND PRACTICE § 4.01 (2000)
(noting broad powers granted to board which include power to choose merger partner for
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successful mergers, it is integral that boards consider the social
implications of M&A, including attitudes toward diversity. 277 It
is asserted that the enhancement of the director's relational role
will facilitate closer examination of a merger's effect on the
company's employees and other non-shareholder stakeholders
and, in turn, increase the likelihood of pre-merger synergy.
It is suggested that a diverse board made up of not only white
males but also women and minorities is better equipped to
effectively perform a relational role. First, as has been discussed,
a diverse board will bolster the new firm's product marketing,
consumer relations, and employee production because it will
more easily relate to diverse employees and consumers. 278
Second, adding female and minority directors will also change
the psychological dynamic of the board and, in turn, the culture
of the entire company. Critical race theorists have argued that
today's discriminatory practices frequently result from
unconscious racism. 279 For example, Patricia Williams asserts
that by blindly enforcing so-called "neutral" legal standards that
do not take account for racial or gender differences, society and,
in this particular context, directors, perpetuate underlying biases
and prejudices.280 For instance, a board composed entirely of
white males might not attach importance to the fact that a
company with which it is about to merge has historically
discriminated against women and minorities. By failing to
emphasize the moral, social, and economic implications of such
discrimination, this board will perpetuate racism or sexism
within its corporation.281 On the other hand, anecdotal evidence
company though stockholders have ultimate discretion to approve or veto
recommendation).
277 See CAREY & OGDEN, supra note 17, at 150 (reiterating necessity of choosing
capable board members); see also Brian Allen Warwick, Reinventing the Wheel: Firestone
and the Role of Ethics in the Corporation, 54 ALA. L. REV. 1455, 1456 (noting heightened
importance on role of board of directors since Caremark).
278 See supra Part C,I.
279 See Wade, supra note 8, at 226 (stating argument of critical race theorists); see
also Charles Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 (1987) (stating that many people in
American society are unaware their own racist ideas).
280 See Williams, supra note 2, at 103 (noting necessity of looking behind accepted
standards in order to find "hidden" prejudice); see also Lawrence, supra note 279, at 356
(noting that racist attitudes are repressed and continue to be part of culture).
281 See Williams, supra note 2, at 103 (highlighting importance of minimizing
prejudice in corporate setting). See generally Lawrence, supra note 279, at 322 (explaining
that most people are unaware of their own racist attitudes).
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shows that because female and minority board members can
empathize with diversity issues, they are more likely to
emphasize diversity in mergers. 282 Importantly, a merger can
also provide an opportunity to create such a diverse board and
align it with "progressive and productive" corporative governance
guidelines. 28 3
D. Recognize the Importance of the Human Issues in Mergers
and Acquisitions
Finally, all businesses stress the importance of the business or
economic issues when deciding whether to merge. However,
commentators have defined the "key variable" separating the
successful mergers from the failures as "the human factor:
before, during, and after the deal."284 Merging companies that
are "hopelessly at odds with each other culturally" tend to fail. It
is, thus, of the utmost importance for the board of directors of the
new firm to define the company's vision, personality, and
behavior and clearly communicate the goals to all levels of the
new organization. 28 5 It is asserted that mergers must be
regarded as ideal opportunities to build new boards, implement
best business and governance practices, and make fresh starts in
terms of diversification.
282 See Knight, supra note 134, at IC (noting women executives emphasize diversity
in merger decision and continue to promote diversity). See generally Healthcare Leads
Other Industries In Female Board Representation Dual Gender Mix Strengthens
Community Trust, HEALTHCARE PR AND MARKETING NEWS, Feb. 18, 1999, at 4 (stating
that board diversity in hospital mergers strengthens public confidence).
283 See CAREY & OGDEN, supra note 17, at 142 (emphasizing need for directors to be
involved with diversity issues).
284 See Carey, supra note 17, at 159 (noting importance of dealing with "human
issues" is constant and will be present at any stage of corporate endeavor).
285 CAREY & OGDEN, supra note 17, at 167 (stating mergers will remain prevalent,
albeit in "definable waves").
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